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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Donghyun Lee 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Economics 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: Essays on Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, Technology, and Frictional 
Costs 
 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in the increasing 
economic globalization of the past couple decades.  Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) is the major source of FDI, particularly for developed countries 
accounting for as much as two-thirds of FDI.  Yet, studies on such cross-border M&A 
activities are scant in the literature. 
This dissertation aims at explaining the relationship between cross-border M&A, 
technology, and frictional costs using both theoretical and empirical analyses.  In chapter 
II, I conduct empirical analysis to determine the relationship between exchange rates and 
acquisition FDI.  I find that depreciation of the host country’s currency leads to an 
increase in acquisition FDI into high-R&D sectors for U.S. inbound acquisition FDI from 
multiple country sources, but not for inbound acquisition FDI for other various developed 
countries.  In chapter III, I develop an equilibrium model of cross-border M&A and show 
that the model predicts that firms from a larger country are more likely to acquire in a 
smaller country when M&A activity is driven by a technology-seeking motive, but the 
opposite is true when it is driven by a market-seeking motive.  I also find empirical 
 v 
evidence that cross-border M&A activity exhibits behavior consistent with this prediction.  
In chapter IV, I empirically examine the relevance of heterogeneous sector-specific 
frictional costs using detailed data on worldwide M&A activity.  Results show that 
cultural distance, tradeability, and regulation play an important role in determining 
heterogeneous frictional costs across different sectors. 
This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing fast in an increasingly 
globalized world and many theoretical and empirical papers in the trade literature have 
focused on FDI to understand globalization.  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) activity is the main driver of FDI patterns across the world, particularly between 
developed countries, which account for the majority of worldwide FDI activities.  
Numbers from the United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development estimate that 
cross-border M&As account for roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of worldwide FDI.  
Despite its importance for FDI, cross-border M&A activity has received very little 
specific focus in the international economics literature. 
This dissertation aims at explaining the relationship between cross-border M&A, 
technology, and frictional costs using both theoretical and empirical analyses.  In chapter 
II, I conduct an empirical analysis to determine the relationship between exchange rates 
and acquisition FDI.  Blonigen (1997) proposes a link between exchange rates and FDI 
motivated to acquire complementary assets (i.e., asset-seeking acquisition FDI).  
However, previous studies have only examined this hypothesis with acquisition FDI data 
from country sources that are mostly U.S. inbound.  Here, I examine the hypothesis using 
the acquisition FDI data from multiple country sources that are inbound for various 
countries.  I find evidence in support of this hypothesis for U.S. inbound acquisition FDI 
from multiple country sources, but not inbound acquisition FDI for other various 
developed countries. 
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In chapter III, I develop and estimate a model of cross-border M&A and focus on 
the technology-seeking explanation.  In particular, I develop an equilibrium model of 
exporting, greenfield FDI, technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking 
cross-border M&A with heterogeneous firms.  The model predicts that firms from a 
larger country are more likely to acquire targets in a smaller country when M&A activity 
is driven by a technology-seeking motive, but the opposite is true when it is driven by a 
market-seeking motive.  Using detailed data on worldwide M&A activity from 1985-
2007, I find empirical evidence that cross-border M&A activity exhibits behavior 
consistent with this prediction. 
In chapter IV, I work with Bruce Blonigen and empirically examine the relevance 
of heterogeneous sector-specific frictional costs.  While there has been significant 
research done to explore the determinants (and frictions) of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), past literature primarily focuses on country-wide FDI flows and very little has 
been done to examine sectoral heterogeneity in FDI patterns.  However, statistics suggest 
that there is evidence of sectoral heterogeneity in FDI patterns.  For example, the 
majority of FDI is in goods-producing sectors, especially the manufacturing sector, and 
undertaken primarily among developed countries, yet manufacturing accounts for a very 
small share of total production activity in these same developed countries compared to 
services-producing sectors.  Here, we empirically examine the relevance of 
heterogeneous sector-specific frictional costs using detailed data on worldwide M&A 
activity.  The results show that cultural distance, tradeability, and regulation play on 
important role in determining heterogeneous frictional costs across different sectors.  In 
chapter V, I present conclusions and possible future research directions. 
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CHAPTER II 
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE LINK BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATES AND ASSET-
SEEKING ACQUISITION FDI 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Blonigen (1997) proposes a link between exchange rates and FDI when FDI is 
motivated to acquire a complementary asset (e.g. technology), commonly referred to as 
asset-seeking acquisition FDI.  He develops a model where the assets acquired in an 
acquisition are easily transferrable within the firm and, thus, able to generate returns in 
any currency.  Thus, a depreciation of a host country’s currency lowers the purchase price 
of the target firm for foreign acquirers, but does not affect the expected returns.  As a 
result, the depreciation of a host country’s currency should increase asset-seeking 
acquisition FDI into that host country.  Using data on Japanese and German acquisition 
FDI patterns into the U.S., and using high R&D sectors as an indicator of sectors where 
asset-seeking acquisition FDI is likely to be taking place, Blonigen finds strong empirical 
support for his hypothesis.  
This chapter examines whether Blonigen’s hypothesis generalizes beyond the 
specific sample he examines.  There are a number of reasons why it may not.  First, the 
U.S. is widely regarded as world’s leading marketplace for ideas and technology.  So 
asset-seeking acquisition FDI into U.S. is likely to be prevalent and thus Blonigen’s 
hypothesis is much more likely to hold.  But asset-seeking acquisition FDI may be a 
fairly insignificant for other inbound markets.  Second, Blonigen’s hypothesis depends on 
the assumption that product markets are segmented, such that the domestic firms in the 
host country could not generate similar returns in the foreign country where the currency 
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has appreciated.  This assumption may not hold as well for countries besides Germany 
and Japan.  Third, Blonigen’s data span a time period (1975-1992) that is now quite dated, 
and the effect may have been specific to the time period he considered. 
I examine a sample of cross-country mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for five of 
the top investing countries in the world:  Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, over the period 1989-2007.  The sample thus includes data on a 
greater set of countries investing in the U.S., as well as data on inbound acquisition FDI 
into countries other than the U.S.  My analysis finds that the evidence for Blonigen’s 
hypothesis is mainly driven by U.S. inbound acquisition FDI from other foreign countries.  
Support for Blonigen’s hypothesis could not be found when U.S. inbound acquisition FDI 
was excluded and only inbound acquisition FDI into other foreign countries were 
considered for estimation.  This is most likely because the U.S. is the world’s leading 
marketplace for ideas and technology.  For example, the U.S. leads the world in R&D 
expenditures.  It had the highest R&D expenditure in the world in 2007 (National Science 
Board 2010).  So asset-seeking acquisition FDI into U.S. is likely to be prevalent and thus 
Blonigen’s hypothesis is much more likely to hold.  Another possibility is that the U.S. 
market is more open to foreign firms and foreign investments compared to other 
countries like Japan.  The Japanese market has been particularly insulated from foreign 
import penetration and FDI (see Bela Balassa (1986); Robert Z. Lawrence (1991, 1993); 
Dennis J. Encarnation (1992); Marcus Noland (1997)).  It is likely that this seclusion is 
preventing asset-seeking acquisition FDI into Japan and therefore not finding evidence 
for Blonigen’s hypothesis. 
 5 
There have been only few subsequent studies that re-examine Blonigen’s 
hypothesis.  Guo and Trivedi (2002) re-examines robustness of Blonigen’s result using 
Blonigen’s data and finite mixture panel models.  They show that Blonigen’s hypothesis 
is robust to alternative econometric models.  Georgopoulos (2008) tests Blonigen’s 
hypothesis using the acquisition FDI data between U.S. and Canada and finds evidence 
supporting Blonigen’s theory.  However, unlike this chapter, it does not consider other 
various countries’ inbound acquisition FDI from multiple country sources.  De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) also test the exchange rate effect using FDI (that includes greenfield and 
acquisition FDI) into U.K. from different country sources.  They don’t find support for 
Blonigen’s hypothesis.  However, it isn’t an exact test of Blonigen’s hypothesis because 
Blonigen assumes that his hypothesis only holds for acquisition FDI that are asset 
seeking. 
There are also other studies that use relative wage effects (Caves 1989) and 
relative wealth effects (Froot and Stein 1991) to explain the link between exchange rates 
and FDI.  However, these studies only focus on the price of the asset and do not provide 
an explanation for the more relevant factor; i.e. the rate of return.   
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the empirical 
specification.  Section 3 presents the data, variable construction, and some descriptive 
statistics.  Section 4 presents the estimation results for the effects of exchange rates on 
numbers of acquisitions, while the last section concludes. 
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2. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Blonigen’s hypothesis suggests that depreciation of the host country’s currency 
leads to an increase in asset-seeking acquisition FDI into that host country.  To test this 
on my data, I follow Blonigen (1997) for specification of the estimation equation: 
             (ln , , , , )ijkt ijt ikt jt jt ijkMA f exch domeacq realgdpg stockmarket                       (1) 
where ijktMA , the dependent variable, is the number of acquisitions into country i from 
country j in industry k at time t; ln ijtexch is the logged real exchange rate between country 
i and country j at time t; iktdomeacq is the number of domestic acquisitions by other 
domestic firms in country i at time t in industry k; jtrealgdpg  is the real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate in country j at time t; jtstockmarket  is the growth rate of the 
stock price index in country j at time t; ijk is the country pair fixed effects between 
country i and j and industry fixed effects interacted (i.e. country pair and industry 
interacted fixed effects).  I also add a time trend in my regression. 
I do not include a variable representing a sectoral import tariff as Blonigen (1997) 
did because it is unavailable at this level of disaggregation for observations where the 
host country is not the United States.  However, the regression results for the portion of 
the sample where this variable can be included show that the main coefficient is not 
sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the tariff variable.  Blonigen’s (1997) analysis also 
found this regressor to be statistically insignificant.  For similar data availability issues, I 
am not able to include a variable to capture the share of value added in an industry.  
However, assuming that relative industry growth rates remain fairly constant over the 
years of my sample, this will be captured by industry fixed effects.  
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 The dependent variable is count data.  Thus, I follow Blonigen in estimating 
equation (1) using a fixed-effect negative binomial specification. 
 
3. DATA, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND SOURCES 
My dependent variable, the number of firms acquired by foreign firms at each 
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level is constructed from the M&A 
data from Thomson’s SDC Platinum, which provides data on firms acquired by foreign 
and domestic firms in different countries.  This data set has monthly information on 
percentage of shares of firms acquired by foreign firms as well as domestic firms.  If the 
percentage of shares acquired by an acquiring firm is 10% or more, I consider this as an 
“acquisition”.1  The SDC Platinum also provides SIC codes for each acquired firms, 
which I use to disaggregate the data into industries at the three-digit SIC level.  It also 
indicates the home country of the target firm and the acquiring firm.  Thus I am able to 
create my dependent variable data at the three-digit industry level for each country pair at 
each year ranging from 1989 to 2007.  As mentioned earlier, the countries I consider in 
my analysis are the top investing countries in the world: Australia, Canada, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.2  
One of my explanatory variables, the number of domestic firms acquired by other 
domestic firms, is constructed in a similar way.  This is an appropriate control variable 
since it will capture many of the other aspects of a favorable environment for acquisition 
                                               
1 This is because 10% or more is considered as acquisition in United States. The regression results still hold 
when 50% or 100% is used instead as the threshold level. 
 
2 These are relevant choices for my analysis since they are the top investing countries and most investments 
occur between them. 
 8 
that are not related to exchange rates.  I expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
positive. 
My main explanatory variable, the logged annual real exchange rate, is 
constructed using the nominal exchange rates data from the Pacific Exchange Rate 
Service and GDP deflators from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).3  I 
use logarithms of the individual exchange rates, so that the percentage changes in 
exchange rates for different countries are comparable, allowing me to formulate 
parsimonious models, which permits me to take advantage of the panel nature of the data.  
The nominal exchange rate is denominated in domestic currency per foreign currency.  
Thus, an increase in the exchange rate variable represents a real depreciation of the 
domestic currency relative to the foreign currency.  Therefore, a positive correlation 
between the exchange rate variable and the asset-seeking acquisitions by foreign firms is 
expected, which is consistent with Blonigen’s hypothesis. 
Following Blonigen (1997), I separate the high R&D industries and low R&D 
industries by using the R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales data obtained from 
National Science Foundation, where high R&D industries are those where R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of sales are at or above the mean of the manufacturing 
sector.  These high R&D sectors should proxy for sectors where asset-seeking acquisition 
FDI is prominent and, thus, the Blonigen hypothesis predicts that the exchange rate effect 
should only prevail for these sectors or, at least, be significantly larger in magnitude.  The 
industries that are categorized as high R&D industries according to this measure are 
reported at the bottom of Table 2 and 3. 
                                               
3 Pacific exchange rate service: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/, USDA: http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/ 
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Annual real GDP growth rates are also obtained from the USDA website.  The 
real GDP growth rates for each foreign country are included to control for demand side 
factors.  If the foreign countries’ economies grew over the years, they will naturally have 
higher demand for M&A.  Thus, I expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive.  
To capture the wealth effects from the stock market, I construct a stock market 
variable using the annual growth rates of each foreign country’s representative stock 
price index.  The data are obtained from Yahoo Finance and the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Group, Inc.4  I expect a positive correlation between the dependent variable and the stock 
market variable.  The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of acquisitions by foreign firms 52440 0.1185164 0.5379338 0 14 
Logged exchange rate 52440 4.99e-10 2.896331 -5.532526 5.532526 
Domestic acquisition 52440 3.43135 9.244897 0 154 
Real GDP Growth rate 52440 2.599263 1.580583 -2.1 5.5 
Stock Market 52440 7.147114 16.90054 -39.82619 58.43752 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 2 provides regression results from estimating equation (1) using a fixed-
effect negative binomial specification.  The first column of results runs the full sample of 
observations without consideration of whether a sector is a high-R&D or low-R&D sector.  
The coefficient on the real exchange rate variable has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at 10%.  This implies that depreciation of the real exchange rate overall leads 
to increase in acquisitions by foreign firms in the manufacturing sector.  The domestic 
                                               
4 Yahoo Finance: http://finance.yahoo.com/, Tokyo Stock Exchange Group: 
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/index.html 
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acquisitions variable and real GDP growth rate variable have expected signs and are 
statistically significant.  The stock market variable has the wrong sign, but is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Table 2. Determinants of number of Foreign Acquisitions in manufacturing sector, 1989-  
              2007                       
Variables Manufacturing High R&D Manufacturinga Low R&D Manufacturing 
  
Negative binomial 
fixed effects 
Negative binomial fixed 
effects 
Negative binomial fixed 
effects 
Logged exchange rate 0.129* 0.193** 0.144 
 (0.068) (0.081) (0.113) 
Domestic acquisition 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Real GDP Growth 
rate 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Stock Market -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time trend 0.003 0.016*** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.779*** 0.882*** 0.671*** 
 (0.121) (0.185) (0.162) 
Observations 19684 6346 13338 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, 
and *** denotes significance at 1%. 
aHigh R&D industries are SIC 281-289, 351-359, 365-367, 371-372, 376, and 381-389; low 
R&D industries are all other manufacturing industries 
 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 provide results when one splits the sample between 
high-R&D and low-R&D manufacturing industries.  The results support Blonigen’s 
hypothesis with a positive and statistically-significant real exchange rate effect for high-
R&D manufacturing industries, but an insignificant effect for low-R&D manufacturing 
industries.  The real exchange rate effect for high-R&D industries has also increased in 
magnitude compared to the first column result.  The effects of the number of domestic 
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acquisitions, real GDP growth rate, and the stock market have identical effects across the 
high-R&D and low-R&D samples.  The time trend variable is the only control variable 
that varies across the two samples and suggests that M&A FDI activity was increasing for 
high-R&D industries over this time period, while it was generally decreasing for low-
R&D industries. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of number of Foreign Acquisitions in manufacturing sector, 1989- 
              2007 
 
I also estimate equation (1) using different subsamples to see whether the results 
are robust across all subsamples and not just driven by U.S. inbound acquisition FDI.  
First, I estimate equation (1) using only U.S. inbound acquisition FDI from Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and United Kingdom.  Table 3, column 1 presents the results.  The 
Variables 
High R&D Manufacturinga (U.S. 
inbound acquisition only) 
High R&D Manufacturinga (U.S. 
inbound acquisition excluded) 
  Negative binomial fixed effects Negative binomial fixed effects 
Logged exchange rate 0.183** -0.196 
 (0.092) (0.136) 
Domestic acquisition 0.01*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) 
Real GDP Growth 
rate 0.15*** 0.134*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
Stock Market -0.002 -0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Time trend -0.007 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 1.018*** 0.774*** 
 (0.276) (0.265) 
Observations 1957 4389 
Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and 
*** denotes significance at 1%. 
aHigh R&D industries are SIC 281-289, 351-359, 365-367, 371-372, 376, and 381-389; low 
R&D industries are all other manufacturing industries 
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coefficient on the logged exchange rate is positive and significant for high R&D 
industries, consistent with Blonigen’s hypothesis.  However, when I estimate equation (1) 
for the subsample where U.S. inbound acquisition data are excluded and only have 
inbound acquisition data for Australia, Canada, Japan, and United Kingdom, the 
coefficient on the logged exchange rate for high R&D industries is not significant and has 
the wrong sign.5  Coefficients on other variables are similar as before. Table 3, column 2 
presents the results. 
This suggests that Blonigen’s hypothesis only prevails for U.S. inbound 
acquisition FDI.  This is most likely because the U.S. is the world’s leading marketplace 
for ideas and technology.  So asset-seeking acquisition FDI into U.S. is likely to be 
prevalent and thus Blonigen’s hypothesis is much likely to hold.  The U.S. has served as 
the undeniable leader in new technology and innovation over the past 40 years.  It is the 
birthplace of the personal computer and the Internet.  And it has given the world major 
innovations in the Information Technology (IT) industry.  Although other nations are 
catching up to U.S. in terms of new technology and innovation, the U.S. is still 
undoubtedly the world’s leader.  Statistics show that the U.S. has the highest R&D 
expenditure in the world, which accounted for 33% of the total world R&D expenditure 
in 2007 (National Science Board 2010).  Therefore, it isn’t very surprising that firms in 
other nations are engaging in asset-seeking acquisition FDI into U.S. to gain access to 
new ideas and technology. 
Another possible reason that Blonigen’s hypothesis only holds for the U.S. is 
because the U.S. market is more open to foreign firms and foreign investments compared 
                                               
5 I also re-estimate the equation separately for each of the four countries.  I still get the same result for each 
country (i.e. coefficient on the logged exchange rate is insignificant for high R&D industries). 
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to other countries like Japan.  Japan’s R&D expenditure accounted for 13% of the total 
world R&D expenditure in 2007, making it the second-largest R&D spending country in 
the world (National Science Board 2010).  However, the reason that I don’t find evidence 
for Blonigen’s hypothesis for acquisition FDI into Japan is because Japanese market has 
been particularly insulated from foreign import penetration and FDI (see Bela Balassa 
(1986); Robert Z. Lawrence (1991, 1993); Dennis J. Encarnation (1992); Marcus Noland 
(1997)).  It is not clear whether Japan’s seclusion is due to artificial barriers by the 
government or cultural and institutional differences with respect to other western 
countries.  But it is likely that this isolation is preventing asset-seeking acquisition FDI 
into Japan and therefore prevents finding evidence for Blonigen’s hypothesis. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Blonigen (1997) proposes a link between exchange rates and FDI when FDI is 
motivated to acquire a complementary asset, but only a few subsequent studies have re-
examined Blonigen’s hypothesis.  In this chapter, I re-examine Blonigen’s hypothesis 
using the acquisition FDI data from multiple country sources that are inbound for various 
countries.  The result provide evidence that Blonigen’s (1997) hypothesized link between 
exchange rates and asset-seeking acquisition FDI is a general result for inbound U.S. 
acquisition FDI from a variety of country sources, but not for inbound in other developed 
countries.  This is an important qualification of the Blonigen’s hypothesis that merits 
future research, as it suggests very different roles for developed countries in the 
international M&A market. 
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The results from this chapter have potential policy implications for U.S. policy 
makers concerning takeovers of domestic firms by foreign firms.  The U.S. government 
has always been concerned with foreign firms acquiring U.S. firms for technology.  In the 
1980’s, the U.S. was mainly concerned with the Japanese firms, and now it’s the Chinese 
firms that may engage in acquisition FDI to gain access to U.S. technology.  Since this 
chapter suggests that asset-seeking acquisition FDI is much more prevalent in the U.S. 
than in other countries, the results from this chapter can assist the policy makers in 
formulating policies to reduce takeovers of U.S. firms by foreign firms, especially when 
U.S. currency depreciates.    
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CHAPTER III 
CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS 
FIRMS: TECHNOLOGY VS. MARKET MOTIVES 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in the increasing economic 
globalization of the past couple decades.  Cross-border M&A is the major source of FDI, 
particularly for developed countries accounting for as much as two-thirds of FDI (World 
Investment Report 2007).  Thus, understanding cross-border M&A plays a crucial role in 
understanding FDI and globalization. 
Various motives can exist for firms to engage in cross-border M&A.  Firms may 
engage in cross-border M&A to obtain market-specific expertise6 of the host country in 
order to better serve the host country’s consumers.  Nocke and Yeaple (2007) build a 
theoretical model based on this motivation.7  Firms may also engage in cross-border 
M&A for corporate control.  This motive is the driving force behind the M&A model in 
Head and Ries (2008). 
In this chapter, I contribute to the growing cross-border M&A literature by 
building a model where M&A activity is potentially motivated by technology.  A 
technology-seeking motive is important in M&A activity, as evidence for this motive can 
be found from various empirical articles (mostly on domestic M&A) in other literatures.  
For example, studies on pharmaceutical firms in the industrial organization literature 
                                               
6 This can be knowledge on local marketing strategies or distribution channel that is country-specific.  This 
motivation is present in my model as well. 
   
7 Their basic theoretical framework is similar to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) with heterogeneous 
firms, which is also the case for my model.  This is a standard setup for foreign market entry models with 
heterogeneous firms. 
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show that firms engage in M&A when seeking patents for drugs, which is an important 
technology in pharmaceutical industry (see, for example Gans et al (2002) and Danzon et 
al (2004)).  Other studies also show that there exists a high correlation between R&D 
expenditure in a firm or in an industry and M&A activities, and firms will use M&A to 
substitute “bought” technology for internally-produced technology (see, for example 
Blonigen and Taylor (2000), Blonigen (1997), and Kogut and Chang (1991)). 
I extend a model introduced by Nocke and Yeaple (2007) to include a technology-
seeking motive for cross-border M&A and develop a general equilibrium model of 
exporting, greenfield FDI, technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking 
cross-border M&A with heterogeneous firms.  The model is developed from the firm 
entry model where there exists a competitive market for M&A, and firms engage in 
cross-border M&A for two reasons: (1) To gain a synergy effect8 by obtaining a target 
firm’s technology, which increases the acquirer’s productivity, or, (2) to obtain a target 
firm’s market-specific expertise, such as knowledge on local marketing strategies or 
distribution channel, which makes the acquirer’s goods more desirable to consumers in 
the host country.9  I term the first motive “technology-seeking” and the second motive 
“market-seeking” throughout the rest of the chapter. 
I first show that there are distinct productivity cutoffs in the model that separate 
exporting, greenfield FDI, technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking 
                                               
8 Synergy is realized because the target firm from another country has a technology that is different from 
the acquirer.  Empirical evidence of this effect can be found in the following articles (see, for example 
Morosini et al (1998), Vermeulen & Barkema (2001), and Gertsen et al (1998)) and (Branstetter (2000), 
Takechi (2006), and Guadalupe et al (2010)). 
  
9 This is similar to the cross-border M&A motive used by Nocke and Yeaple (2007). 
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cross-border M&A in equilibrium and show how different firm types sort into these 
foreign market access modes. 
Second, I show that the model generates a sharp theoretical distinction between 
the two motives:  Relative country size differences between the home and the host 
countries will have a different effect on technology-seeking cross-border M&A and 
market-seeking cross-border M&A.  In particular, proportionately more firms engage 
in technology-seeking cross-border M&A, the bigger their home country’s size is 
relative to the host country, whereas the opposite is true for market-seeking cross-
border M&A.  This provides me with an estimation strategy to identify the technology-
seeking motive in the data.  I provide evidence of this result by showing that cross-
border M&A into high-R&D sectors10 in the host country increases approximately by a 
factor of 1.13 as the relative size difference between the home and the host country (i.e. 
home country size minus host country size) increases, suggesting that the bigger the 
home country is relative to the host country, more firms from the home country engage 
in technology-seeking cross-border M&A into the smaller host country. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the theoretical 
model.  Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium of the model and determines the equilibrium 
pattern of the four foreign market entry modes (i.e. exporting, greenfield FDI, 
technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking cross-border M&A).  
Section 4 looks at how asymmetric country size affects the equilibrium using 
comparative statics to uncover the technology-seeking motive.  Section 5 conducts an 
empirical analysis suggested by the comparative statics result and provides evidence of a 
                                               
10 M&As that take place in these sectors are likely to be technology-seeking since firms in these sectors are 
technology-intensive. 
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technology-seeking motive consistent with the model’s prediction using worldwide cross-
border M&A data.  The last section presents conclusions. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 The model consists of two identical countries 1 and 2.  The aggregate income 
level in both countries is denoted by Y.  Labor is the only factor of production.  The price 
of labor in each country is equal and normalized to one because a homogeneous and 
perfectly competitive product is produced in every country and traded freely.1112  The 
homogeneous product is produced with one unit of labor per unit of output.  The model is 
developed from a firm entry model where there exists a competitive market for M&A.  I 
seek the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.  The timing of the each stage is as 
follows: 
Stage 1: Potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or not in each 
country.   
Stage 2: Firms decide on how to serve the foreign market to maximize their 
profits by choosing from the following entry modes; 1) exporting, 2) greenfield 
FDI, 3) participate in the cross-border mergers and acquisitions market as buyers 
or sellers (either technology-seeking or market-seeking).  
Stage 3: Firms compete in the market as price setters and receive profits.  Firms 
can discriminate between markets and set different prices for the two countries. 
                                               
11 In fact, I already assume countries are identical thus wages are equal and homogeneous good may seem 
unnecessary.  However, homogeneous good insures the wages are equal later when I do comparative statics 
where country sizes aren’t identical. 
 
12 This model best represents horizontal FDI between developed countries but not vertical FDI since there 
are no wage differences between the two countries which firms can exploit. 
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2.1.  Preferences 
 The representative consumer has CES preferences over varieties of each 
differentiated good and Cobb-Douglas preferences over the differentiated goods and the 
homogeneous good.  The representative consumer spends Y on the differentiated goods 
and (1 )Y on the homogeneous good.  Consumer’s utility over the varieties of the 
differentiated goods and the homogeneous good can be written as: 
 1 1[ ( ) ( ) ]U q x d Z

  

   

  , 
1



 , 1                                   (1) 
where ( )x  and ( )q   are the level of consumption and the perceived quality of variety ω, 
respectively.  The variable Z is the level of consumption of the homogeneous good, and σ 
is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. 
 
2.2.  Entry 
There is a continuum of atomless and ex ante identical potential entrants.  They 
can only enter in their own country and are each endowed with the knowledge to produce 
a unique good.  If an entrant decides not to enter, it obtains a payoff of zero.  If it decides 
to enter the entrant must pay an entry fee of eF .  After the entrant enters, it receives a 
random draw of a technological capability m  from distribution H with support (0, ) , 
and a market-specific expertise.13  The market-specific expertise is not drawn from a 
distribution and the same market-specific expertise is given to all the entrants entering in 
the same country.  This is different from Nocke and Yeaple (2007), where market-
specific expertise is drawn from a step function.  Assuming that it is not drawn from a 
                                               
13 Nocke and Yeaple (2007) used the terminology mobile capability for technological capability and non-
mobile capability for market-specific expertise. 
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step function allows me to skip the domestic acquisition process.  Results will still hold 
even if I assume that market-specific expertise is drawn from a step function.  Also, since 
I am mainly interested in technology as an incentive for cross-border acquisition I only 
focus on the case where technological capability is drawn from a continuous distribution, 
unlike Nocke and Yeaple (2007). 
 
2.3.  Firms 
Firms differ in their capabilities.  There are two different capabilities that firms 
receive upon entry.  The first is a technological capability.  The efficiency of a firm’s 
production technology is assumed to depend on this capability m .  A firm’s marginal 
cost ( )c m  is the inverse of m :  
1
( )c m
m
                                                                 (2) 
The second capability is the market-specific expertise, such as knowledge of local 
marketing strategies or distribution channels that is country-specific.  Firms receive 
market-specific expertise of their home country upon entry.  This is country-specific and 
is not given to foreign firms.  A market-specific expertise is more effective in its country 
of origin than abroad; that is, domestic firms have better marketing strategies for the 
domestic consumers than foreign firms.  There is empirical evidence supporting this idea 
(see, Maurin et al.).  This is reflected in ( )q  , the perceived quality of the product.  If the 
firm uses its market-specific expertise originating in country i for serving country i then 
its perceived quality in that country is 1iq  .  But if it uses this capability to serve country 
j then its perceived quality in country j is only jq  , where (0,1)  .   
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2.3.1.  Additional frictional costs 
There are other frictional costs incurred by a foreign firm when selling its 
products across borders.  These are the same frictional costs also imposed by Nocke and 
Yeaple (2007) in their model.  First, there is a fixed coordination cost cF  associated with 
managing production in country i while using a market-specific expertise originating 
from country j to serve country i.  This coordination cost can be avoided if production 
takes place only in country i and the firm uses a country i’s market-specific expertise or if 
production takes place in both countries and the firm uses a market-specific expertise 
from each country.  Second, iceberg-type transportation costs are incurred for shipping 
output across borders: 1   units need to be shipped for one unit to arrive in the foreign 
country.  Thus, if the good is produced in country i and then shipped to country j, the 
marginal cost of serving country j is ( )c m  .  For notational convenience, I define the 
following transformations of m  and  : 1m m   and ( 1)T    , with T<1. 
 
2.4.  Foreign market access 
 All firms serve their home market entirely from local production, but the way they 
serve the foreign market can differ depending on their productivities.  Firms have the 
choice of serving the foreign market by exporting, greenfield FDI, or by participating in 
the international M&A market.  A firm may choose greenfield FDI to avoid the iceberg-
type transportation cost, but it must incur a fixed cost cF .  A firm can avoid this fixed 
cost by exporting, but in this case it must incur the iceberg-type transportation cost.  
Alternatively, a firm can engage in cross-border M&A to serve the foreign market by 
purchasing a target firm.  There are two possible motives for cross-border M&A; (1) To 
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gain a synergy effect by obtaining a target firm’s technological capability, or, (2) to 
obtain a target firm’s market-specific expertise. 
 
2.4.1.  Technology-seeking M&A 
If a firm acquires a target firm from another country, the target firm’s 
technological capability is transferred directly to the acquiring firm upon acquisition and 
synergy is realized.  The synergy is realized because the target firm from another country 
has a technology that is different from the acquirer that gives a different perspective.14 
Specifically, the merged firm’s marginal cost becomes: 
1
( )c m
m g



                                                               (3) 
where, 1g   reflects the synergy gain from the merger.  Note that the realized synergy 
parameter, g , is constant and doesn’t depend on the target’s technological capability.  
This simplifies the calculations, though Appendix A shows that I get the same results if I 
assume that g  increases as target’s m  increases.  For notational convenience, I define 
the following transformation of g : 1g g   .  Note g >1.  Synergy effect is not present in 
Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) model.  This is something I newly introduce to the literature 
to analyze technology-seeking cross-border M&A. 
 
 
 
                                               
14 The target’s technological capability does not have to be necessarily more efficient than the acquirer, for 
the synergy to be realized.  If the target’s technological capability gives a different perspective on 
producing the product unknown to the acquirer, this could be enough for the synergy effect to be realized.  
There are also articles that support this idea (see Appendix A).  More detailed discussion on this is in the 
Appendix A. 
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2.4.2.  Market-seeking M&A 
Market-seeking M&A is motivated by a firm’s desire to increase the perceived 
quality of its good in the foreign country by obtaining the foreign country’s market-
specific expertise and to avoid the fixed coordination cost cF .  However, the acquirer can 
access the market-specific expertise of the target firm only after paying a fixed 
integration cost (IC) in addition to the target firm’s purchase price (I assume cIC F ).  
Such costs may arise, for example, if the acquirer and the target come from very different 
cultural backgrounds and the acquirer then has difficulties in integrating the target’s 
market-specific expertise.  The integration cost of cross-border M&A due to cultural 
differences is the subject of an extensive literature (See, for example, Finkelstein (1999), 
Zhu and Huang (2007), Drogendijk and Slangen (2006)).15 
 
2.4.3.  Equilibrium price in M&A market 
There exists a perfectly competitive M&A market where entrants can be bought 
and sold.  In this model, target firms’ prices are equal because no matter what target 
firms’ types are, they all give the same synergy effect and the same market-specific 
expertise to the foreign acquirer; i.e. target firms’ values are identical to potential 
acquirers. 16  Thus, there only exists one equilibrium price, which I’ll denote as Q.  This 
price is determined by the supply of the target firms and the demand of the target firms 
by foreign acquirers. 
 
                                               
15 More detailed discussion on this and a descriptive statistical evidence of IC is in the Appendix A.  IC is 
not present in Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) model. 
 
16 This is similar to Nocke and Yeaple (2007). 
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2.4.4.  Summary of foreign market access modes and associated costs 
Depending on the firm’s choice of foreign market entry mode, associated costs can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Exporting: No fixed cost, but incurs iceberg type transportation cost. 
2. Greenfield FDI: Incurs a fixed coordination cost cF , but no transportation cost. 
3. Technology-seeking cross-border M&A: Incurs a fixed purchase cost Q and a 
fixed coordination cost cF , but no transportation cost.  
4. Market-seeking cross-border M&A: Incurs a fixed purchase cost Q and a fixed 
integration cost IC, but no fixed coordination cost cF and no transportation cost.   
 
3.  THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
 In this section, I analyze the equilibrium of the model and determine how firms 
select into different foreign market entry modes (i.e. exporting, greenfield FDI, 
technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking cross-border M&A) in 
equilibrium.  I start by deriving the gross profits of firms at the third stage. 
Solving the representative consumer’s utility maximization problem, I obtain the 
following demand function for any variety ω in country k: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k k kx Y P q p                                                    (4) 
where ( )kp   is the price of variety ω in country k, and 
1 1/1[ ( ) ( ) ]k k kP q p d 

   

                                                 (5) 
the aggregate price index for the varieties produced in country k.  Since countries are 
symmetric, the price indices in the two countries are the same: i.e. 1 2P P P  . 
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Let ˆ ( )kc   denote the marginal cost of selling variety ω in country k, including the 
iceberg-type transportation cost.  Since this is monopolistic competition and firms can 
price discriminate between countries, profit maximization then implies that the price of 
variety ω ( )kp   is equal to ˆ ( ) /kc   .  Hence, the gross profit of a firm selling variety ω 
in country k is given by,                   
                                              1ˆ( )( ( ))k kSq c                                               (6) 
where,                                                 
1( )
Y
S
P 

  
                          (7) 
Now, by using (6) and by associating the fixed costs incurred for each foreign 
entry mode, I derive the following total profits generated from domestic and foreign 
countries depending on the firm’s entry mode: 
 
 
 
 
In the second stage, firms decide on the entry mode that maximizes their total 
profits.  This depends on their technological capability m, because total profit is 
increasing in m, but at different rates (i.e. different slopes) for each entry mode.  In fact, if 
I take the partial derivative of the profits with respect to m, I can order the slopes as;  
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x f g am m m m          , and therefore, I obtain the following result. 
Proposition 1. In equilibrium there exist four thresholds, 0 s x g am m m m     such 
that, firms with a technological capability between (0, )sm  sell themselves in the cross-
border M&A market, firms with a technological capability between [ , )s xm m export, firms 
with a technological capability between [ , )x gm m  engage in greenfield FDI, firms with a 
 Total Profit 
Exporting ( ) (1 )x m T Sm    
Greenfield FDI ( ) (1 )f cm Sm F     
Technology-seeking cross-border M&A ( ) (1 )g cm Smg Q F      
Market-seeking cross-border M&A ( ) 2a m Smg Q IC     
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technological capability between [ , )g am m  engage in technology-seeking cross-border 
M&A, firms with technological capability between [ , )am  engage in market- seeking 
cross border M&A. 
 
Graphical illustration of Proposition 1 is shown in figure 1.  Each curve represents 
the profit functions ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )x f g am m m m    ) and the horizontal line is the target 
firm’s price Q.  The bolded section of the curve indicates that the corresponding entry 
mode (or becoming a target at price Q) gives the firm the highest total profit given the 
firm’s current technological capability m.  Therefore, firms are partitioned into five 
different subsets according to their technological capability:  1) become a target and earn 
Q (if it can’t generate a profit higher than Q from other entry modes), 2) become an 
exporter and earn ( )x m , 3) engage in greenfield FDI and earn ( )f m , 4) engage in 
technology-seeking cross-border M&A and earn ( )g m , 5) engage in market-seeking 
cross-border M&A and earn ( )a m .  Firms sort into these five cases depending on their 
technological capability.  
Also, the four thresholds are shown in the figure, each of which occurs at the 
intersections of the curves. 
The values of the four thresholds are as follows: 
Equate ( )x m  and Q,                           (1 )s
Q
m
T S


          (8) 
Equate ( )x m  and ( )f m ,              (1 )
c
x
F
m
S T


                  (9) 
Equate ( )f m  and ( )g m ,             (1 )( 1)g
Q
m
g S

 
                     (10)  
Equating ( )g m  and ( )a m ,                (1 )
c
a
IC F
m
S g



                           (11) 
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Figure 1. Profits of each entry mode and thresholds 
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In the first stage, free entry of ex ante identical entrants implies that the expected value of 
a new entrant is equal to zero:  i.e., 
 
0
( ) ( ) 0eV m dH m F

                                                  (12) 
where V(m) is the value of a firm after entering the market, which depends on the profit it 
generates. 
Lastly for the merger market to clear, the mass of target firms must be equal to the 
mass of acquirers.  Let E be the mass of entrants in both countries (E is same in both 
countries because they are identical).  Then the mass of targets, ( )sEH m  must equal the 
mass of acquirers, (1 ( ))gE H m .  This simplifies to: 
( ) ( ) 1s gH m H m                                                 (13) 
 
4.  ASYMMETRIC COUNTRY SIZE AND M&A ACTIVITY 
In this section, I analyze how asymmetric country size between the two countries 
in my model can affect the equilibrium thresholds, especially gm  and am .  I undertake 
this comparative static exercise to provide me with a sharp prediction about how M&A 
activity varies with the separate cross-border M&A motives; i.e. technology-seeking 
versus market-seeking motives.  The effect of asymmetric country size on the market-
seeking motive is similar to Nocke and Yeaple (2004) in my model.  However, 
asymmetric country size has an opposite effect on M&A activity motivated by 
technology-seeking. 
The motivation behind acquiring market-specific expertise from a country is to 
raise demand for a firm’s good in that country.  On the other hand, the motivation behind 
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acquiring technological capability is to get a synergy effect, which is independent of 
access to the foreign market.  Thus, if we have two countries with different sizes, 
intuitively firms from the smaller country will be relatively more interested in the market-
specific expertise of the larger country and less interested in the technological capability 
because the profit increase from accessing the larger country’s market is relatively large.  
On the other hand, firms from the larger country will be relatively more interested in the 
technological capability of the smaller country and less interested in the market-specific 
expertise because the relative profit increase from accessing the smaller country’s market 
is small.  Using comparative statics I show separation of the two cross-border M&A 
motives consistent with this intuition.  
To address how country size differences affect the equilibrium outcome, I 
consider a change in country sizes that maintains global income so that 0k ldY dY   .  
Then I use the following lemma from Nocke and Yeaple (2004) to analyze how this 
change in income affects the endogenous variables in my model. 
Lemma 1 Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e. 1 2Y Y , and 
consider a small change in country sizes such that k ldY dY  . Then, the change in any 
endogenous variable u has the same absolute value in the two countries, but is of 
opposite sign: k ldu du  .   
Proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix B. 
By applying Lemma 1, I can derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e. 1 2Y Y , and 
consider a small increase in the size of country k and a small decrease in the size of 
country l ≠ k such that 0k ldY dY   .  
Then, 0k ls sdm dm   , 0
k l
x xdm dm   , 0
k l
g gdm dm   , and 0
k l
a adm dm   .   
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Proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix B.17   
 
Figure 2.  Directions of the thresholds’ movements as countries become asymmetric 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the movements of the thresholds from their initial points as 
country size changes (the arrows indicate the direction of the movements from their 
initial points).  Since, 0k lg gdm dm    and 0
k l
a adm dm   , the threshold gm  falls and 
the threshold am  rises in country k (the larger country), implying that proportionately 
more firms in country k are now engaging in cross-border M&A to obtain the synergy 
                                               
17 Note, this proposition is true conditional on the fact that the acquisition price Q that firms has to pay 
does not change as much when countries’ sizes change.  I will illustrate this in detail in my proof in the 
appendix. 
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effect and proportionately less firms are engaging in market-seeking cross-border M&A.  
The opposite is true in country l (the smaller country) since the threshold gm  went up and 
the threshold am  went down. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
5.1.  Specification 
In this section, I conduct an empirical analysis to examine the hypothesis that 
asymmetric country size will have different impacts on M&A activity, depending on 
whether it is motivated by technology-seeking or market-seeking behavior. 
Nocke and Yeaple (2004) shows that when only the market-seeking motive 
exists for cross-border M&A, proportionately more firms in the home country engage 
in cross-border M&A into the host country as the home country’s size decreases 
relative to the host country.  This indicates that the level of cross-border M&A deals is 
an inverse function of the size difference (i.e. home country size minus host country 
size): 
( )ijt jt itMA f size size                                               (14) 
where j denotes the home country and i denotes the host country.  The ijtMA  variable is 
the cross-border M&A activity in country i from country j in time t, jtsize is the size of 
country j at time t, and itsize  is the size of country i at time t.  Then, ( )jt itsize size  
should have a negative effect on ijtMA , if acquisition of market-specific expertise is the 
only cross-border M&A motive. 
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In contrast, Proposition 2 in the previous section predicts that ( )jt itsize size  
has a positive effect on ijtMA  when a technology-seeking motive is driving cross-
border M&A activity.  As the home country’s size increases relative to its host country, 
proportionately more firms from the home country engage in technology-seeking 
cross-border M&A into the host country.   
To distinguish between these two contrasting predictions, I need to identify 
situations in which a technology-seeking motive is important vis-à-vis a market-
seeking motive.  To do this, I modify equation (14) to include an interaction term 
between the size difference variable and an indicator variable that takes a value of one 
when M&A deal is technology-seeking and zero when it isn’t: 
( ( ), ( ))ijt jt it jt itMA f tech size size size size                                 (15) 
where the interaction term should have a positive effect on ijtMA  if Proposition 2 is 
correct.  The relationship between the interaction term and ijtMA  from equation (15) 
provides an estimation strategy that I can take to the data to identify the evidence for 
Proposition 2’s prediction when technology-seeking motive is present. 
 The following is the related estimating specification for equation (15): 
1 2 3( ) ( )ijkt ikt jt it jt it ijktMA tech size size size size tech                       (16) 
The dependent variable, ijktMA  is the number of firms acquired in country i in industry 
k by firms in country j in time t.  My dependent variable is constructed at the four-digit 
SIC industry level from the mergers and acquisitions data at SDC Platinum.  If an 
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acquirer acquires 10% or more of the target’s shares, I consider this as an acquisition.18 
The value of M&A deals cannot be used since they are not consistently available in the 
data.  Since the dependent variable is count data, negative binomial estimation will be 
used.19 
The size difference variable, ( )jt itsize size is equal to the log of real jtGDP  
minus the log of real itGDP , which captures the country size difference between the 
home and the host countries.  Real GDP is used to measure country size because 
country size is represented by aggregate income in my model. 
There is no way of knowing the true motivation behind the cross-border M&A 
that took place because firms don’t report the exact reason for acquisition.  However, 
R&D expenditures are a commonly used proxy for indicating the importance of 
technology in an industry and I use it here for this purpose as well.20  Thus, I specify 
the indicator variable for technology-seeking motive, tech , as taking the value of “1” 
for industries with high R&D expenditures.  Later, I explore other proxies for the tech 
variable. 
I separate the high R&D industries and low R&D industries by using the R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of sales data obtained from National Science Foundation 
to construct tech , and categorize industries as high R&D industries if those industries 
                                               
18 This is because 10% or more is considered as an acquisition in United States. The regression results are 
still the same when 50% or 100% is used instead as the threshold level. 
 
19 I use negative binomial model instead of poisson model because summary statistics suggests that 
dependent variable is over-dispersed (i.e. mean <variance). 
 
20 I also try using high-tech share to proxy for the importance of technology in an industry.  I still get 
similar results.  Discussion and results on this are in the robustness checks section. 
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have R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales that are at or above the mean of the 
manufacturing sector.21 
The main variable of interest is the interaction term.  Proposition 2 implies that 
technology-seeking cross-border M&A into host country will increase as relative size 
difference between the home and the host country increase.  Thus, the main coefficient 
of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term and I expect the coefficient on it to 
be positive and significant.  I include the size difference and tech variable separately in 
all my estimations to control for any independent effects of these variables on cross-
border M&A activity. 
Industry and time fixed effects, ikt  are included to capture any industry-
specific favorable environment for acquisition at time t in the host country i.22  The 
ijkt  denotes the error term. 
 
5.1.1.  Additional control variables 
After providing initial baseline estimates of equation (16), I explore how robust 
my results are to including other control variables that can potentially affect cross-
border M&A.  Most of these control variables are taken from previous trade literature 
papers such as Di Giovanni (2005) and Head and Ries (2008), which estimate the 
determinants of cross-border M&A activity. 
                                               
21 This method has been used by Blonigen (1997) to separate high-tech industries from low-tech industries 
in manufacturing sector. 
 
22 Note that tech variable drops because of perfect multicollinearity with the fixed effects. 
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First, annual real GDP growth rate of the home country, jtrealgdpg , is included 
to control for demand side factors.  I expect this variable to have a positive effect on 
the dependent variable. 
Second, I include ln( )ijtexch , a logged exchange rate between countries i and j 
at time t.  This is a relevant control variable because Blonigen (1997) suggests that 
depreciation of the domestic currency can encourage inflow of asset seeking type 
acquisition FDI.  The exchange rates are denominated in home country’s currency per 
host country’s currency.  Thus, a decrease in this variable implies depreciation of the 
host country’s currency.  I log the exchange rates so that percentage changes in 
exchange rates for different country pairs are comparable.  I expect this to have a 
negative effect on the dependent variable. 
 Third, I include stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP of the home 
country, jtstockcap , as a control variable because financial deepening (i.e. increase in 
the size of financial markets) of the home country can influence cross-border M&A, as 
suggested by Di Giovanni (2005).  I expect this to have a positive effect on the 
dependent variable. 
 Fourth, I also include domestic credit provided to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP of the home country, jtcredit , as a control variable.  This is another 
variable suggested by Di Giovanni (2005) to account for the effect of financial 
deepening on cross-border M&A.  I expect this to have a positive effect. 
 Fifth, I include the distance between the home and the host countries’ capital 
cities (in miles), ijdistance , as a control variable.  The gravity model suggests that 
there’s less foreign direct investment when the distance between the home and the host 
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countries increases.  I expect this to be true for cross-border M&A activity as well.  
Thus, I expect this variable to have a negative effect on the dependent variable. 
 Sixth, I include the following dummy variables: common language usage 
dummy variable, ijlang , directional dummy variables ijToColy , which indicates M&A 
to a former colony from its colonizer, and ijFromColy , which indicates M&A from a 
colony to its colonizer.  These variables are included to control for the cultural distance 
between the home and the host countries that can potentially affect the dependent 
variable.  Empirical evidence from the trade literature suggests that cultural similarity 
between the home and the host countries increase foreign direct investment activities 
between the two countries.  Thus, I expect these variables to have a positive effect on 
the dependent variables.  The three dummy variables ijlang , ijToColy , and ijFromColy  
have also been used in Head and Ries’ (2008) paper to measure cultural distance. 
 Finally, I include a time-varying dummy variable, ijtrta , that takes a value of 
one when the home and the host countries belong to a common regional trade 
agreement.  Trade agreement variable has frequently been used in past FDI or cross-
border M&A studies as a control variable (e.g. Di Giovanni (2005)). 
The following is the estimating specification with additional controls included: 
1 2 3 4( ) ( )ijkt ikt jt it jt it jtMA tech size size size size tech realgdpg            
5 6 7 8ln( )ijt jt jt ijexch stockcap credit distance        
                        9 10 11 12ij ij ij ijt ijktlang ToColy FromColy rta                               (17) 
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5.2.  Data 
I use the mergers and acquisitions data from Thomson SDC Platinum (software 
which contains data on M&A, loans, equity etc), which has data on acquired firms by 
foreign and domestic firms in various countries to construct my dependent variable.23  
If the percentage of shares acquired by a foreign firm is 10% or more, I consider this as 
an acquisition.  SDC Platinum also has SIC codes at the four-digit level for each 
acquired firm and provides the country of origin of the firms that are engaged in 
acquisition. 
Using the data set, I create a M&A count dependent variable at the four-digit 
SIC industry level and form a panel data set that ranges from 1985 to 2007, for the 
OECD countries (except Slovakia).24  I use OECD countries because more than 70% of 
FDI activities are among the developed countries.  All countries in my sample are both 
host and home countries. 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales data used for creating the high R&D 
industry dummy variable (tech) are obtained from the U.S. National Science 
Foundation.  Annual real GDP growth rates are obtained from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) website.25  Exchange rate data are obtained from 
the Pacific Exchange Rate Service.26  The stock market capitalization to GDP and 
domestic credit to GDP data are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
database from the World Bank.  The distance variable is constructed using the great 
                                               
23 Further information on these data are at: http://www.thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/sdc 
 
24 M&A data for Slovakia is not included in SDC Platinum. 
 
25 Link to this data source: http://www.usda.gov/ 
 
26 Link to this data source: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/ 
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circle distance calculator27.  The three dummy variables ijlang , ijToColy , ijFromColy  
and the time-varying dummy variable, ijtrta  are obtained from the cepii.fr website. 
Figure 3 shows the cross-border M&A deals into OECD countries in my 
dataset from 1985 to 2007.  Cross-border M&A deals have been growing steadily since 
1985.  Although M&A deals dropped in 2001 and 2002, they began to increase again 
in 2003 and this trend continued through the end of the sample in 2007.  This trend is 
consistent with other sources, which highlight the growing trend of cross-border M&A 
over the past couple of decades.  Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the variables. 
 
Figure 3.  Cross-border M&A Deals of the OECD Countries, 1985-2007 
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27 Link to this calculator: http://www.marinewaypoints.com/learn/greatcircle.shtml 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 1985-2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of acquisition by foreign firms 18769380 0.003 0.082 0 45 
Size difference (home minus host) 18769380 0 2.068 -6.798 6.798 
Home country's real GDP growth rate 18769380 2.961 2.633 -11.89 11.28 
Logged exchange rates 15410670 5.62e-09 3.404 -12.611 12.611 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 15589560 65.755 56.202 0.188 479.742 
Domestic credit to GDP 18234720 86.189 49.077 11.114 319.468 
Distance 18769380 3330.293 3344.478 107.504 12327.05 
 
5.3.  Results 
Regression results for equation (16) are provided in the first column of Table 5.  
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant which is consistent 
with my prediction and suggests that cross-border M&A into host country’s high R&D 
industries increases as relative size difference between the home and the host country 
increases.  Assuming the tech dummy variable correctly proxies for the technology-
seeking motive, this implies that the bigger the home country is relative to the host 
country, more firms in the home country engage in technology-seeking cross-border 
M&A into the smaller host country.  Thus, this supports Proposition 2’s prediction of 
technology-seeking motivated cross-border M&A behavior when country sizes are 
asymmetric. 
Coefficient estimates in a negative binomial model are not straightforward to 
interpret.  Incidence rate ratio interpretation is more commonly used for negative 
binomial models.  The second column of Table 5 presents the incidence rate ratio for 
each coefficient.  By using this ratio, the effect of the interaction term on the dependent 
variable can be interpreted as follows: one unit increase in the size difference variable 
increases the cross-border M&A in high R&D industries by a factor of 1.132. 
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Table 5. Country size difference and technology-seeking cross-border M&A 
Variables Negative binomial Incidence Rate Ratio Negative binomial 
Interaction of size difference 
and tech dummy 0.124*** 1.132***  0.150*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size difference (home minus 
host) 0.716*** 2.046***  0.693*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
tech dummy - - - 
 - - - 
Home country's real GDP 
growth rate - - 0.034*** 
 - - (0.003) 
Logged exchange rates - - -0.142*** 
 - - (0.003) 
Stock market capitalization to 
GDP - - 0.003*** 
 - - (0.0001) 
Domestic credit to GDP - - 0.004*** 
 - - (0.0002) 
Distance - - -0.0002*** 
 - - (0.000004) 
Language - - 0.851*** 
 - - (0.014) 
To Colony - - 0.495*** 
 - - (0.020) 
From Colony - - 0.378*** 
 - - (0.023) 
RTA - - 0.660*** 
 - - (0.022) 
Industry and Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,034,264 1,034,264 892,083 
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
 
An interesting observation is that the coefficient on the size difference variable is 
positive and significant; i.e. size difference has a positive effect on cross-border M&A 
activities overall.  This is counter to what Nocke and Yeaple (2004) predicts where 
market-seeking is the sole motive for cross-border M&A, because in that case, size 
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difference variable should have a negative effect on cross-border M&A.  In fact, based on 
my prediction from Proposition 2, this indicates that the technology-seeking motive 
rather than market-seeking motive is much more prevalent in other industries as well.  
Also, considering that countries in my sample are all industrialized countries, this result 
can shed some light on the motive behind horizontal FDI.  My result is counter to the 
common belief in FDI literature that firm’s motive behind horizontal FDI is to access the 
foreign market.  As a matter of fact, it suggests that technology-seeking motive is much 
more common than market-seeking motive. 
Table 5, column 3, shows the regression results for equation (17), which includes 
additional control variables.  My results are robust to additional control variables.  The 
magnitude of the main coefficient (i.e. the interaction term) has not changed much 
compared to the baseline estimation, and it is still statistically significant and has a 
positive sign.  The coefficient for the size difference variable is significant and similar in 
magnitude and has the same sign as the coefficient from the baseline estimation. 
The coefficient on the annual real GDP growth rate of the home country has the 
positive sign and is significant.  This suggests that as the home country grows it increases 
the demand for M&As into other countries, which is consistent with my expectation.  The 
coefficients on the stock market capitalization variable and the domestic credit variable 
are both significant and positive.  These results suggest that financial deepening (i.e. 
increase in the size of financial markets) in the home country increases the cross-border 
M&A activities.  These results are consistent with Di Giovanni’s (2005) results.  The 
coefficient on the exchange rate variable is significant and has the expected negative sign 
as well.  The coefficient on the distance variable is negative and significant, which 
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suggests that increase in the distance between the home and the host countries decreases 
the M&A activities between the two countries.  This result is consistent with the gravity 
model in the trade literature.  The coefficient on the common language usage dummy 
variable is positive and significant, which suggests that common language usage 
increases the M&A activities between the home and the host countries.  This result is 
similar to the gravity model, which states that cultural similarity between the two 
countries increases trade and FDI.  The coefficient on the dummy variable To Colony and 
the coefficient on the dummy variable From Colony are positive and significant.  These 
results again suggest that cultural similarity does have positive impact on the cross-border 
M&A activities.  Finally, the coefficient on the common regional trade agreement (RTA) 
variable is positive and significant, which suggests that there are more cross-border M&A 
activities between the countries that are in the same trade agreement. 
 
5.3.1.  Robustness checks 
In this section, I discuss further robustness checks of the results.  First, Blonigen 
has suggested that mergers and acquisitions data from SDC Platinum before 1990 are not 
very clean for some countries (e.g. Germany, France).  Thus, I estimate equation (17) 
using the data from 1990 to 2007.  The first column of table 6 shows the results.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term is still significant and has the expected sign.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient is also similar to the estimation coefficient in table 5.  In fact, 
most coefficients on other variables also have the same signs as the estimation 
coefficients in table 5, and the magnitude is very similar as well. 
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Table 6. Country size difference and technology-seeking cross-border M&A 
Variables 1990-2007 High-tech share 
Same target and 
acquirer SIC 
  Negative binomial Negative binomial Negative binomial 
Interaction of size difference 
and tech dummy 0.148*** 0.121*** 0.228*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) 
Size difference (home minus 
host) 0.694*** 0.702*** 0.671*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
tech dummy - - - 
 - - - 
Home country's real GDP 
growth rate 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Logged exchange rates -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.118*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Stock market capitalization to 
GDP 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Domestic credit to GDP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Distance -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000005) (0.000004) (0.000008) 
Language 0.879*** 0.848*** 0.984*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.026) 
To Colony 0.469*** 0.496*** 0.457*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.037) 
From Colony 0.369*** 0.376*** 0.328*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.044) 
RTA 0.609*** 0.659*** 0.619*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.041) 
Industry and Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 855,216 892,083 292,886 
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
 
Second, I examine alternative measures to proxy for indicating the importance 
of the technology in an industry.  I construct a high-tech share for each industry where 
high-tech share measures the share of assets in an industry that are considered high 
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technology in nature.  I follow Feenstra and Hanson’s (1999) method in constructing 
the high-tech share.  I categorize industries as high-tech industries if an industry’s 
high-tech share is at or above the mean of the total industry high-tech share.  Table 6, 
column two, shows estimation results of equation (17) using this alternative measure 
for tech.  The coefficient for the interaction term is significant and has the expected 
sign.  The magnitude is also quite similar to the coefficient in table 5.  Most 
coefficients on other variables also have the same signs as the estimation coefficients 
in table 5, and the magnitude is very similar as well.  This suggests that my results are 
robust to other measures of technology-seeking motive. 
Third, the industries in my data set are classified by the SIC code of the target, 
but the target’s SIC code and acquirer’s SIC code are often not the same.  Thus, one 
might question whether an acquisition of a target in a high R&D industry by an 
acquirer in a low R&D industry should be considered as technology-seeking.  In order 
to make sure that I am really capturing technology-seeking motive with the tech 
dummy, I look at a subsample of cross-border M&A where the target’s SIC code and 
acquirer’s SIC code are the same.  Table 6, column three, presents the results.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term is significant and has the expected sign.  In fact, the 
magnitude is slightly higher than the estimation coefficient from table 5.  This is 
probably because cross-border M&As in high R&D industries are now less noisy and 
just include the technology-seeking motives.  Thus, the result supports my prediction 
from the theory.  Again, most coefficients on other variables have the same signs as the 
estimation coefficients in table 5, and the magnitude is very similar as well. 
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Fourth, I check to see whether my results are sensitive to the 10% threshold level 
I use to define an acquisition.  I perform regressions on equation (17) using two different 
dependent variables constructed by using 50% and 100% as the threshold level.  The 
main coefficient is still significant and has the expected sign for both cases.  Thus, the 
result doesn’t seem to be sensitive to threshold levels used to construct the dependent 
variable.   
Fifth, I estimate equation (17) using the dataset that exclude U.S. inbound cross-
border M&A.  I conduct this robustness check because chapter II results suggest that 
technology-seeking M&A into U.S. is more prevalent than in other countries.  I find that 
the main coefficient is still significant and has the expected sign. 
Lastly, since I have panel data, the standard errors should be clustered.  However, 
standard errors cannot be clustered in the negative binomial model for panel dataset in a 
way that is similar to standard regression models.  Thus, I perform bootstrap with a 
cluster option instead on equation (17).  I perform bootstrap estimation, with clustering 
on industry and country pair.  Estimation results show that the main coefficient (i.e. the 
coefficient on the interaction term) is still significant at the 1% level. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Cross-border M&A has been growing fast over the past couple of decades and has 
been the major source of FDI.  I build a model of cross-border M&A and provide 
empirical evidence of the model in this chapter to enhance our understanding of cross-
border M&A. 
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There are two main contributions of this chapter.  The first is the incorporation of 
the technology-seeking motive into a M&A model where technologies yield synergy 
gains.  I show that there are distinct productivity cutoffs in the model that separate 
exporting, greenfield FDI, technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking 
cross-border M&A in equilibrium and show how different firm types sort into these 
foreign market access modes. 
Second, I show that the model generates a sharp theoretical distinction between 
the two cross-border M&A motives.  In particular, proportionately more firms engage 
in technology-seeking cross-border M&A as their home country’s size increase relative 
to the host country, whereas the opposite is true for market-seeking cross-border M&A.  
I use this prediction of the model to come up with an estimation strategy to identify the 
technology-seeking motive in the data.  I provide evidence of this result by showing 
that the cross-border M&A into high-R&D sectors in the host country increases as the 
relative size difference between the home and the host country (i.e. home country size 
minus host country size) increases. 
The primary focus of this chapter is to better understand cross-border M&A by 
building a theoretical model.  However, some welfare and policy implications still can be 
drawn from the results of my model.  When firms engage in technology-seeking cross-
border M&A they reach a new level of productivity due to synergy gain.  Thus, new 
differentiated products that are produced at a new productivity level are introduced to the 
economy.  This can be interpreted as a welfare gain in a CES preference setting where 
there are gains from variety.   
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As for policy implications, there have been some concerns about hostile takeovers 
of domestic firms by foreign firms to acquire technology.  Further development of my 
model could provide deeper understanding of these M&A activities by foreign firms and 
several issues that are of concern to the policy makers.  Also, if we think solely from a 
“gains from variety” perspective, cross-border M&A may increase welfare of the 
consumers by increasing the number of products in the economy, which is an important 
implication for policy makers. 
The theoretical model, I develop in this chapter is somewhat limited in the sense 
that it is a static model, whereas in the real world acquisition process, synergy realization 
and integrating market-specific expertise occur over a period of time.  Thus, future 
research will look at developing dynamic models of M&A activity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HETEROGENEOUS FRICTIONAL COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-
BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Bruce Blonigen contributed to this work by participating in the development of 
the theoretical model and the construction of the tradeability variable.  I contributed to 
this work by developing the theoretical model, constructing variables for empirical 
analysis, and conducting empirical analysis.  I also did all the writing. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The growth of world foreign direct investment (FDI) over the past few decades has been 
rapid and has received significant attention.  Despite this rapid growth in FDI, like other 
cross-border transactions, world FDI activity is less than one would expect in a 
frictionless world.  In accordance with this, there has been significant research effort to 
explore the determinants (and frictions) that determine worldwide FDI patterns.  
Surprisingly, this prior literature on FDI determinants has done very little to examine 
sectoral heterogeneity in FDI patterns, focusing primarily on country-wide FDI flows and 
affiliate activity. 
Perhaps the most surprising feature in this regard is that the majority of FDI is 
manufacturing and undertaken primarily amongst developed countries, yet manufacturing 
accounts for a very small (and rapidly declining) share of activity in these same 
developed countries.  For example in the US, over 40% of value added by foreign 
affiliates operating in the US was in manufacturing in 2007 (Anderson and Zeile, BEA).  
However, total value added by manufacturing sector in the US only accounted for 12% of 
the GDP in 2007 (Gilmore et al, BEA).  Likewise, almost 48% of value added in 2004 by 
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US affiliates operating in foreign countries was in manufacturing (Raymond et al. table 
19.2 BEA).28  While the share of manufacturing in FDI activity has been declining a fair 
amount over the past couple of decades, these high manufacturing shares beg a number of 
important questions, especially in light of the fact that so much of FDI activity is between 
developed countries where manufacturing activity is fairly low as a share of their 
economies and quickly shrinking. 
First, what are the important differences that make FDI in non-manufacturing (i.e., 
service sectors) much more difficult than manufacturing?  A number of possible 
candidates are in play.  First, cultural dissimilarities or “cultural distance” may impact the 
ability of a foreign firm to operate in another country much more in service sectors than 
manufacturing sectors.  Examples of such “culturally- and language-sensitive” non-
manufacturing sectors include media, film, and advertising.  Second, many services are 
non-tradeable, whereas virtually all of manufacturing is highly tradeable.  Exporting may 
be an important source of information of foreign markets for firms, significantly reducing 
the fixed costs (and uncertainty) of the decision to engage in FDI.  Thus, the FDI decision 
may involve a much higher information hurdle for a non-tradeable sector that cannot rely 
on prior exporting experience into the market.  Third, many service sectors are connected 
with market features, such as natural monopolies or public goods characteristics, that lead 
governments to highly restrict FDI in these sectors or even have public ownership of the 
sector, effectively prohibiting FDI.  Such sectors include some modes of transportation, 
utilities, some communication sectors, and even health services.   
In this chapter, we contribute to the growing FDI and cross-border M&A 
literature by providing empirical evidence for heterogeneous sector-specific frictional 
                                               
28 Percentage was slightly higher for US affiliates operating in Europe (50%). 
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costs.  In particular, we test our three hypotheses empirically and find that cultural 
distance, tradeability, and regulation all play an important role in determining 
heterogeneous frictional costs across different sectors.  First, we show that cultural 
distance, measured by Kogut and Singh’s cultural index, inhibits cross-border M&A 
activity more in services-producing sectors than in other sectors.  We find that a one-unit 
increase in the Kogut and Singh’s cultural index decreases the number of cross-border 
M&A by 0.0003 units in services-producing sectors.  Second, we also show that 
tradeability, measured by the sum of exports and imports divided by shipments of the 
domestic firms in the industry, increases cross-border M&A activity in services-
producing sectors.  We find that a one-unit increase in the tradeability variable increases 
the number of cross-border M&A into services-producing sectors by 0.0002 units.  
Finally, we show that regulation, measured by the regulation indicator index from the 
OECD.stat, inhibits cross-border M&A activity.  In particular, a one-unit increase in the 
regulation indicator index decreases the number of cross-border M&A by 0.00006.  The 
data we use for this analysis are the cross-border M&A data from Thomson SDC 
Platinum database ranging from 1985-2007.  There are three main reasons that we use 
cross-border M&A to study frictional costs in FDI.  First, our theoretical motivation is 
about M&A for corporate control.  Second, the cross-border M&A data from SDC 
Platinum are disaggregated at the four-digit SIC level.  This is important because it 
allows us to conduct our analysis at the industry level and identify frictional costs at the 
industry level.  Total FDI data are not available at this industry level on a consistent basis 
across countries.  Third, according to the world investment report (UNCTAD 2000), two 
thirds of the FDI takes the form of cross-border M&A.  Thus, by conducting empirical 
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analysis with the cross-border M&A data, we are capturing a substantial component of 
the FDI pattern.   
We also contribute to the growing literature, which uses the gravity equation to 
investigate the determinants of cross-border M&A (e.g. Di Giovanni (2005)).  Head and 
Ries (2008) in their paper provide a micro-foundation for the gravity equation and its 
frictional costs when examining cross-border M&A by building a model with monitoring 
costs and provide empirical support for their model.  In this chapter, we use their model 
as a basis for our estimation. However, unlike their paper where frictional costs are 
assumed to be homogeneous across sectors, we extend their model to have sectoral 
heterogeneity and provide empirical evidence for heterogeneous sector-specific frictional 
costs. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the theoretical 
model.  Section 3 derives an empirical specification from the model, conducts an 
empirical analysis, and provides evidence.  The last section presents conclusions. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
We use Head and Ries’ (2008) model as a base theoretical framework for our 
analysis, and modify the original model to accommodate heterogeneous sector-specific 
frictional costs.  Head and Ries (2008) model cross-border M&A as an international 
market for corporate control context, where the headquarters’ monitoring cost of the 
subsidiary plays a key role in the cross-border M&A decision.  Frictional costs associated 
with cross-border M&A comes from this monitoring cost because they assume that 
monitoring costs increase as the geographical or cultural distance between the home and 
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the host countries increases.  Thus, the value of the merged firm decreases as the 
monitoring cost increases, which is possibly correlated with cultural or geographical 
distance. 
The model starts with a simple inspection game, which is played between the 
headquarters (HQ) and its subsidiary (Sub).  We assume that without monitoring by the 
HQ, the manager of the Sub lacks incentives to exert effort to maximize the value of the 
Sub.  We also assume that monitoring requires costs that are increasing in distance (both 
cultural and geographical) between the HQ and its Sub.  Sub chooses whether to work or 
shirk.  Gross profit depends on the contributions of HQ and Sub, which we denote by a 
and b respectively.  HQ always adds a, whereas Sub adds b only when it chooses to exert 
effort.  HQ simultaneously chooses whether to trust Sub or verify whether it has worked 
or not.  The following table shows the payoffs of Sub and HQ. 
 
    HQ chooses   
   Trust (1 – y) Verify (y) 
Sub manager chooses Shirk (x) w, a – w 0, a – c 
  Work (1 – x) w – e, a + b – w  w – e, a + b – w – c  
 
HQ pays w to Sub unless HQ verifies and finds out shirking, in which case Sub gets zero.  
Working generates gross output of a+b, but Sub incurs cost of effort, e.  Verification 
costs HQ c (i.e. the monitoring costs).  Following Head and Ries (2008), we assume 
b>w>e>c>0.  Under these assumptions, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.  
In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Sub shirks with probability x and HQ verifies with 
probability y.  Expected revenues are given by a+b(1 – x ).  HQ compensates Sub unless 
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HQ verifies that shirking occurred (probability xy).  Taking these observations into 
account, HQ’s expected payoff is 
                              v = a + b(1 – x ) – cy – w(1 – xy)                                             (1) 
Sub’s expect utility is w(1 – xy) – e(1 – x).  The agents choose their respective 
probabilities taking the others’ as given.  The first order condition for HQ is therefore vy 
= – c  + wx = 0 and that for Sub is vx = – wy + e =0.  The equilibrium mixing probabilities 
are therefore x=c/w and y=e/w.  Plugging these results back into HQ’s payoff gives us, 
                                               v = a + b(1 – c/w) – w                                                       (2) 
Maximizing (2) with respect to w implies the contract of paying w = bc  except 
when HQ verifies that shirking has occurred.  Substituting bc  back into (2) results in:  
                                             2v a b bc                                                        (3) 
 Equation (3) shows us that higher verification costs lower the value of the Sub to 
HQs.  Thus, if two HQs of equal a were bidding, the one with lower inspection costs 
would bid higher.  Head and Ries (2008) make c an increasing function of ijD , which is a 
vector of geographic and cultural distance measures between the host country i and the 
home country j.  Therefore, ijD  acts as frictional costs and reduces the value of the 
merged firm as the distance between the home and the host countries increases.  In this 
chapter, to accommodate our sector-specific heterogeneous frictional costs assumption, 
we modify the model and assume that ijkD  is sector-specific as well, where subscript k 
denotes the sector.  The ijkD  is a vector that includes country-pair variables (geographical 
and cultural distances), as well as sector-specific variables such as tradeability and 
regulation. 
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Specifically, we assume that 2[ ]
2
k ijk
ijk
D
c

 .  The monitoring cost, ijkc  is now 
heterogeneous across different sectors.  Here k denotes the industry in which the cross-
border M&A takes place and therefore, ijkD has differing impact on ijkc  depending on the 
value of k .  Thus, we modify equation (3) as follows: 
                                                       
2
k ijk
ijk
D
v a b b

                                                  (4) 
Equation (4) illustrates that ijkD  acts as frictional costs and reduces the value of the 
merged firm differently across sectors depending on the value of k  as the distance 
between the home and the host countries or as other sector-specific frictions increase.  
Similar to Head and Ries (2008), equation (4) illustrates an ability versus proximity 
trade-off; i.e. high-ability HQs may have a lower willingness to pay for a target than a 
less able, but more proximate HQs.  However, unlike Head and Ries (2008), this trade-off 
varies across sectors in our model. 
 
3.  EMPIRICS 
 
3.1.  Specification 
We assume that the HQ that anticipates the highest expected payoff (i.e. v) makes 
the highest bid and wins the auction for control of a subsidiary.  Let ijk  denote the 
probability that a HQ from country j takes control of a randomly drawn target in country i 
in industry k.  Also, let ikK  denote the asset value of the entire stock of targets in the host 
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country i in industry k.  Then we can represent the expected bilateral FDI stocks as 
follows, 
                                                   [ ]ijk ijk ikE F K                                                  (5) 
We follow Head and Ries (2008) in specifying ijk .  We assume that country j has 
jm  headquarters, each of which have different valuations for a given target in country i.  
Heterogeneity in the valuations is introduced through the HQ value-added term a.  We 
assume that the cumulative density of a takes the Gumbel (type-I extreme value): 
exp( exp( ( ) / ))x     , where   is the location parameter and   is the shape 
parameter.  Using the results of Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 39), one can 
then show that ijk  is given by the multinomial logit formula: 
                              
exp[ ln( ) ( ) ]
exp[ ln( ) ( ) ]
j
l
b
j k ijk
ijk b
l k ilk
l
m D
m D

 

 



 

 
                                    (6) 
Substituting (6) into (5), we can express expected bilateral FDI stocks as 
                                 
exp[ ( ) ]
[ ]
exp[ ( ) ]
j
l
b
j k ijk
ijk ikb
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l
m D
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m D

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



                               (7) 
In order to obtain an estimating equation, we first define ( )bk k  , which 
determines the FDI-impeding effect.  Also, [ ]ijkE F  depends only on the shares of HQs in 
each country, so we introduce jmj
ll
m
s
m


 to represent a country’s share of the world’s 
bidders.  And finally, we define exp[ ]lmik l k ilklB s D

    as the “bid competition” for 
targets in country i in industry k.  Re-expression of (7) in terms of these variables yields: 
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                                    1[ ] exp[ ]j mijk k ijk j ik ikE F D s K B

 
                                    (8) 
Equation (8) now resembles the gravity equation where expected bilateral stocks 
are increasing in the product of origin and destination size variables ( mjs  and ikK ) and 
decreasing in measures of bilateral distance.  Higher bid competition in i in industry k 
(i.e., ikB ) implies that a higher fraction of assets in i in industry k will be taken by rivals 
from other countries, thereby reducing the expected bilateral stocks of HQs from country 
j. 
Further re-arrangement of equation (8) gives us some insight into how the 
parameters of the model can be estimated: 
                           [ ] exp[ ln ln ln ]j mijk j ik ik k ijkE F s K B D

                             (9) 
Equation (9) shows that bilateral FDI can be separated into a origin j-specific term 
relating to its share of the world’s HQs ( ln mjs ) and their mean ability (
j
 ), a destination i 
and industry k specific term relating to the share of target assets ( ln ikK ) and the 
competing set of bidders ( ln ikB ).  We will denote ln
j m
j jO s

   as outward direct 
investment effect for origin j, and ln lnik ik ikI K B   as inward direct investment effect 
for destination i in industry k.  Compressing the outward and inward effects into one term 
each, we obtain the following expression for expected bilateral FDI stocks: 
                                        [ ] exp[ ]ijk j ik k ijkE F O I D                                       (10) 
 In order to move from the expected values determined in the theory to the actual 
values of FDI recorded in the data set, we define 
[ ]
ijk
ijk
ijk
F
E F
   as the ratio of actual to 
expected bilateral FDI stocks.  Using equation (10), 
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                                              [ ] exp[ ]ijk ijk ijk j ik k ijk ijkF E F O I D                             (11) 
The ijkD  is a vector consisting of geographical distance, cultural distance, tradeability, 
regulation, and unobserved linkages: 
                                  { , , , , }ijk ij ij k ik ijkD distance CD tradeability regulation u                (12) 
The variable ijdistance  is the physical distance between countries i and j and ijCD  is a 
cultural distance variable between countries i and j.  The variable ktradeability  measures 
the degree of tradeability in industry k (greater tradeability corresponds to high values of 
ktradeability ).  The variable ikregulation  measures the degree of regulation in country i’s 
industry k (stricter regulation corresponds to high values of ikregulation ).  And finally, 
ijku  capture all the unobserved linkages between two countries that affect the monitoring 
cost.  Equation (11) can now be written as, 
                                       1 2exp[ijk j ik ij k ijF O I distance CD      
                                                    3 4 5( ln )]k ik ijk ijktradeability regulation u            (13) 
Note that 2k  varies with k because ijCD  has differing effects on different industries.  
Define 5 lnijk ijk ijku     as the error term and re-write equation (13) as, 
1 2exp[ijk j ik ij k ijF O I distance CD      
                                                      3 4 ]k ik ijktradeability regulation                         (14) 
Equation (14) now can be estimated to test our hypotheses that heterogeneous 
frictional costs arise due to: I) Sensitivity to cultural distance in services-producing 
industries compared to other industries, II) Low tradeability in services-producing 
industries, or III) High regulation in services-producing industries.  First, to check 
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hypothesis I, we interact ijCD  with services-producing industries dummy variable and 
see if the interaction term has negative effect on the dependent variable.  We test 
hypothesis II by checking whether the tradeability variable has a positive effect on the 
dependent variable.  Low tradeability of an industry can increase the informational 
frictional cost because exporting may be an important source of information on foreign 
markets for firms, which can significantly reduce the fixed costs (and uncertainty) of the 
decision to engage in FDI.  Lastly, we test hypothesis III by estimating whether the 
regulation variable has a negative effect on the dependent variable. 
We use cross-border M&A data to construct the dependent variable.  The 
following is our estimating equation: 
1 2 3 4exp[ijkt j ik ij ij ijMA O I distance CD service service CD           
                                         5 6 ]k ikt ijkttradeability regulation e                                    (15) 
The dependent variable, ijktMA  is the number of firms acquired in country i in industry 
k by firms in country j at time t.29  The variable ijdistance  measures the physical 
distance between the home and the host country.  We expect the coefficient on this 
variable to be negative.  The variable ijCD  measures the cultural distance between the 
home and the host country.  We expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.  
We expect coefficients on geographical and cultural distance variables to be negative 
because past studies in the gravity equation literature have shown this to be true (e.g. 
Head and Ries (2008)).  The variable service  is an indicator variable that takes a value 
of one if the industry is a services-producing sector.  This variable is included to 
                                               
29 The value of M&A deals cannot be used since they are not consistently available in the data. 
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capture its independent effect.  The variable ijservice CD  is an interaction term of the 
two variables, ijCD  and service .  We expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
negative because it identifies the effect of cultural distance on cross-border M&As into 
services-producing sectors.  The variable ktradeability  measures the tradeability of 
industry k.  An increase in this variable implies that the industry’s tradeability is high.  
We expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive because engaging in trade in 
foreign country can serve as an important information channel on the foreign market 
that can lead to increase in FDI activity.  The variable iktregulation  measures the level 
of regulation imposed by the host country at the industry level.  We expect the 
coefficient on this variable to be negative because high regulations inhibit FDI activity.  
The ijkte  denotes the error term.  Since the dependent variable is count data, negative 
binomial estimation is used to estimate equation (15). 
 
3.2.  Data 
We use the M&A data from the Thomson SDC Platinum database, which has 
data on acquired firms by foreign and domestic firms in various countries, to construct 
our dependent variable.  If the percentage of shares acquired by a foreign firm is 10% 
or more, we consider this as an acquisition.  SDC Platinum also has SIC codes at the 
four-digit level for each acquired firm and provides the country of origin of the firms 
that are engaged in acquisition. 
Using the data set, we create a M&A count dependent variable at the four-digit 
SIC industry level and form a data set that ranges from 1985 to 2007, for the OECD 
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countries (except Slovakia).30  We use OECD countries because more than 70% of FDI 
activities are among the developed countries.  All countries in the sample are both host 
and home countries. 
  A services-producing sector indicator variable is constructed by giving it a 
value of one if the industry is a private services-producing industry.31  These are the 
industries that have SIC codes greater than 4000 and less than 9000 at four-digit level.  
All other sectors take on a value of zero.  According to BEA (Gilmore et al.), in 2009, 
value added by private services-producing industries accounted for 68.7% of the US 
GDP.  Value added by private goods-producing industries32 accounted for 17.7% of the 
U.S. GDP.  Our dataset show that 51.5% of the total cross-border M&A occurred in 
private services-producing industries and 48.4% of the total cross-border M&A 
occurred in private goods-producing industries.  As we can see from these descriptive 
statistics, cross-border M&A seems to be much more frequent in goods-producing 
industries than in services-producing industries relative to their total size in the 
economy. 
We use Kogut and Singh’s cultural index to measure the cultural distance 
between the home and the host country.  The cultural dimensions needed to construct 
this index are taken from the Geert Hofstede’s website.  The tradeability measure is the 
sum of exports and imports divided by shipments of the domestic firms in the industry.  
                                               
30 M&A data for Slovakia is not included in SDC Platinum. 
 
31 This is the definition used by BEA and include the following industries: utilities; wholesale trade; retail 
trade; transportation and warehousing; information; finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; 
professional and business services; educational services, health care, and social assistance; arts, 
entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services; and other services, except government. 
 
32 This is the definition used by BEA and includes following industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing 
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We use U.S. data for the year 2000 to construct this measure for our four-digit SIC 
industries (see Blonigen (2011) for more details).   
We use the regulation indicator index from the OECD.stat website for our 
regulation variable.  This regulation indicator index measures the level of regulation 
for non-manufacturing industries (mostly industries in service sectors) in each OECD 
countries.  The regulation indicator index is a weighted average score (the score is on a 
scale of 0-6, 6 being the highest regulation).  Manufacturing and other sectors, which 
don’t have a regulation indicator index, take on a value of zero in our regulation 
variable.  The distance variable is constructed using the great circle distance.  It 
measures the physical distance between the home and the host countries’ capital cities 
in miles.  Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables.  The mean of 
tradeability in services-producing sectors is 0.054, which is substantially less than the 
full sample average (0.357) and much less than the goods-producing sector average 
(0.619). 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of acquisition by foreign 
firms 18769380 0.003 0.082 0 45 
Distance 18769380 3330.293 3344.478 107.504 12327.05 
Cultural Distance 17474940 2.003 1.507 0.026 7.472 
Tradeability 17032512 0.357 1.235 0 21.402 
Regulation 18745244 0.246 0.879 0 6 
 
3.3.  Results 
Column 1 of table 8 shows the results from estimating equation (15).  The 
coefficient on the interaction term of cultural distance and service sector indicator 
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variable is negative and significant.  This implies that cultural differences between the 
home and the host countries have a greater negative impact on cross-border M&As in 
services-producing sectors than in goods-producing sectors.  This supports our first 
hypothesis that the service sectors are more sensitive to cultural differences and thus 
firms in the service sector are less likely to engage in cross-border M&A than firms in 
the manufacturing sectors. 
 
Table 8. Frictional costs in cross-border M&A activity: OECD countries 
 
Variables Negative binomial Negative binomial Negative binomial 
  Full sample Full sample Marginal effects 
Distance -0.000289*** -0.000311*** -0.0000002 
 (2.68e-06) (3.02e-06) - 
Cultural Distance -0.351*** -0.337*** -0.0002 
 (0.00750) (0.00760) - 
Service - 0.536*** 0.0003 
 - (0.0159) - 
Service x Cultural Distance -0.0874*** -0.0895*** -0.00005 
 (0.00996) (0.00918) - 
Tradeability - -0.0572*** -0.000031 
 - (0.00607) - 
Regulation -0.336*** -0.107*** -0.00006 
 (0.0119) (0.00648) - 
Constant 1.947*** 0.216*** - 
 (0.0275) (0.0274) - 
Home country dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Host country dummy No Yes Yes 
Host country and industry FE Yes No No 
Observations 6,752,295 15,841,737 15,841,738 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Coefficient on the regulation variable is negative and significant.  This suggests 
that strong regulation hinders cross-border M&A.  This is consistent with our 
 63
expectation and provides evidence for our third hypothesis that strong regulations 
inhibit cross-border M&A.  The coefficient on the distance variable is also negative 
and significant.  This is consistent with our expectation and shows that increase in 
physical distance between the home and the host countries decrease cross-border M&A 
activities.   
Coefficient on the tradeability variable is not reported because its effect is 
subsumed by the host country and industry fixed effects.  Therefore, we cannot test our 
second hypothesis by estimating equation (15).  We modify equation (15) by excluding 
the host country and industry fixed effects and instead include host county dummy 
variables and re-estimate the modified equation.  The results are presented in column 2.  
The coefficients don’t seem to change much when host country dummy variable is 
included instead of host country and industry fixed effects.  This suggests that our 
results are not very sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the host country and industry 
fixed effects. 
Coefficient on the tradeability variable is negative and significant.  This is 
counter to our expectation.  It seems to suggest that industries that have a lot of exports 
and imports engage in less cross-border M&A.  This also makes sense in a way.  If 
there’s a lot of exports and imports in an industry it implies that firms in that industry 
use exporting as the main foreign market entry method rather than cross-border M&A.  
This can be the case if the most desirable or easiest way to access this particular 
industry by foreign firms is exporting.  Thus it is conceivable that our tradeability 
coefficient is negative. 
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Column 3 presents the marginal effects of the variables from column 2.  The 
marginal effect of cultural distance is –0.0002 and the marginal effect of the interaction 
term is –0.00005.  Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in the Kogut and 
Singh’s cultural index (1.507) decreases the number of cross-border M&As by 
approximately 0.0005 units into services-producing sectors.  Since the predicted 
dependent variable is equal to 0.0005, this implies that one standard deviation increase 
in the cultural index leads to 100% decrease in the dependent variable from its 
predicted value for services-producing sectors, which is quite significant.  The 
marginal effect of regulation suggests that a one standard deviation increase in 
regulation indicator index (0.879) decreases the number of cross-border M&As by 
approximately 0.00005 units.  Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the regulation 
indicator index leads to a 10% decrease in the dependent variable from its predicted 
value.  The marginal effect of tradeability suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in tradeability (1.235) decreases the number of cross-border M&As by 
approximately 0.00004 units.  Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the 
tradeability variable leads to a 8% decrease in the dependent variable from its 
predicted value. 
 The tradeability variable overall has a negative impact on cross-border M&A 
activity.  However, if we just consider services-producing sectors, the coefficient on 
the tradeability variable becomes positive and significant.  First column in table 9 
shows the coefficient and the second column shows the marginal effect of tradeability 
when only services-producing sectors are considered.  This shows that in service 
sectors, where exporting activity rarely occurs, exporting activity by firms does lead to 
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an increase in cross-border M&A.  This provides some support for our second 
hypothesis.  The marginal effect suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the 
tradeability variable (0.228) increases the number of cross-border M&A into services-
producing sectors by 0.00005 units.33  Since the predicted value of the dependent 
variable in services-producing sectors is 0.0006, this implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the tradeability variable leads to a 8.3% increase in the dependent 
variable from its predicted value. 
 
Table 9. Frictional costs in cross-border M&A activity: OECD countries (services-
producing sectors only) 
 
Variables Negative binomial Negative binomial 
  Coefficients Marginal effects 
Distance -0.000332*** -0.0000002 
 (4.37e-06) - 
Cultural Distance -0.447*** -0.0003 
 (0.00864) - 
Service - - 
 - - 
Service x Cultural Distance - - 
 - - 
Tradeability 0.288*** 0.0002 
 (0.0283) - 
Regulation -0.0966*** -0.00006 
 (0.00661) - 
Constant 0.770*** - 
 (0.0388) - 
Home country dummy Yes Yes 
Host country dummy Yes Yes 
Host country and industry FE No No 
Observations 6,921,693 6,921,694 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
                                               
33 Standard deviation of tradeability in services-producing sectors is 0.228. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 The growth of world FDI over the past few decades has been rapid and has 
received significant attention.  In accordance with this, there has been significant research 
effort to explore the frictions that determine worldwide FDI patterns.  But past literature 
primarily focused on country-wide FDI flows and very little has been done to examine 
sectoral heterogeneity in FDI patterns. 
In this chapter, we empirically examine the relevance of heterogeneous sector-
specific frictional costs using detailed data on worldwide mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) activity.  We contribute to the growing FDI and cross-border M&A literature by 
providing empirical evidence for heterogeneous sector-specific frictional costs.  Our 
results show that cultural distance, tradeability, and regulation play an important role in 
determining heterogeneous frictional costs across different sectors. 
Also, our findings from this chapter provide better understanding of FDI and 
cross-border M&A patterns, which can offer valuable information for policy makers as 
well.  Past studies have shown that FDI activities can have significant impact on the host 
country’s economy.  By better understanding heterogeneous sectoral frictions in FDI 
patterns the government can implement better policies for different sectors to increase or 
decrease FDI activity into their country.  For example, our study shows that regulation 
does inhibit FDI.  Thus, if the government wants more FDI into service sectors it can 
loosen the regulation to encourage FDI.  On the other hand, if the government is 
concerned about takeovers of domestic firms by foreign firms to access the technology in 
manufacturing sectors, imposing tougher regulations can be an effective tool in 
preventing hostile takeovers by foreign firms. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
FDI has played a major role in the increasing economic globalization of the past 
couple decades.  Cross-border M&A is the major source of FDI, particularly for 
developed countries accounting for as much as two-thirds of FDI.  Yet, studies on such 
cross-border M&A activities are scant in the literature. 
This dissertation looks at the relationship between cross-border M&A, technology, 
and frictional costs using both theoretical and empirical analyses to better understand 
cross-border M&A activity.  In chapter II, I find that depreciation of the host country’s 
currency leads to increase in acquisition FDI that are seeking complementary assets (e.g. 
technology) for U.S. inbound acquisition FDI from multiple country sources, but not for 
inbound acquisition FDI for other various developed countries.  In chapter III, I develop 
an equilibrium model of cross-border M&A and show that the model predicts that firms 
from a larger country are more likely to acquire in a smaller country when M&A activity 
is driven by a technology-seeking motive, but the opposite is true when it is driven by a 
market-seeking motive.  I also find empirical evidence that cross-border M&A activity 
exhibits behavior consistent with this prediction.  In chapter IV, I empirically examine 
the relevance of heterogeneous sector-specific frictional costs using detailed data on 
worldwide M&A activity.  Results show that cultural distance, tradeability, and 
regulation play on important role in determining heterogeneous frictional costs across 
different sectors. 
The theoretical model, I develop in my third chapter is somewhat limited in the 
sense that it is a static model.  In the real world acquisition process, synergy realization 
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and integrating market-specific expertise occur over a period of time.  Thus, in the future 
I plan to develop dynamic models of M&A activity.  Also, recent data suggests that FDI 
activity into agricultural and natural resources industries have been increasing.  These 
activities seem to be motivated by the desire to secure food supply or natural resources.  
Thus, in the future I plan to develop cross-border M&A model with this resource-seeking 
motive and analyze empirically as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIXED EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
In order to develop a fixed effects Negative binomial model, Hausman et al. (1984) start 
with a standard Poisson distribution with parameter it  where it  is the conditional mean 
and variance of the dependent variable.  Standard procedure is to make it  to be an 
exponential function of the explanatory variables: 
( | ) var( | ) exp( )it it it it it itE y X y X X     where ity  denotes the dependent variable and 
itX  denotes the explanatory variables. 
The Negative binomial model allows for heterogeneity in the mean function by 
introducing an additional stochastic component to it : exp( )it it itX    , where it  
captures unobserved heterogeneity and is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  
Fixed effects negative binomial model is obtained by building the fixed effect into the 
model as an individual specific i : ( | ) exp( )it it i itE y X X  . 
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APPENDIX B 
DISCUSSION ON SYNERGY EFFECT AND INTEGRATION COST 
1.  DISCUSSION ON THE SYNERGY EFFECT 
The synergy is realized because the target firm from another country has a 
technology that is different from the acquirer.  In this case, the target’s technological 
capability does not have to be necessarily more advanced or more efficient than the 
acquirer, for the synergy to be realized.  As long as the target’s technological capability 
gives a different perspective on producing the product unknown to the acquirer, then this 
could be useful information and thus cross-border M&A will take place to obtain the 
synergy effect.  Evidence of synergy effect from cross-border M&A can be found from 
the following articles (see, for example Morosini et al (1998), Vermeulen & Barkema 
(2001), and Gertsen et al (1998)).  Empirical papers from international trade literature 
also suggest possible synergy realization coming from cross-border M&A (see, for 
example Branstetter (2000) and Takechi (2006)). 
 
2.  SYNERGY DEPENDENT ON TARGET’S TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
In my model I assume that the synergy effect g, coming from acquiring target 
firm’s technological capability is constant.  It might sound more realistic if g depends on 
target firm’s technological capability.  However, I will show that even if g depends on 
target firm’s technological capability it will not change the equilibrium outcome as long 
as acquirer can’t observe target firm’s technological capability.  Assuming that the 
acquirer doesn’t know the true value of the target’s technological capability is not so far 
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fetched compared to the real world because even in the real world, the acquirer cannot 
know the true value of the target. 
I’ll assume that g is a function of m where ( )g  increase as m increase.  I’ll also 
assume that ( )g m is greater than 1 where m  is the lowest value of m (this is to insure that 
expected value of ( )g m  is greater than 1)34.  Then the actual profit realized for the 
acquirer from synergy will depend on ( )g m  but when acquirer makes a cross-border 
M&A decision, they will base it on the expected profit generated from getting expected 
synergy, i.e. ( ( ) | )sE g m m m .  This expected value is constant and is equal to all 
potential acquirers so their decision making process will be identical to having a constant 
synergy g.  Thus, the equilibrium outcome will look identical too. 
 
3.  CULTURAL DISTANCE AND INTEGRATION COST 
Integration cost of cross-border M&A is the subject of an extensive literature.  For 
example, when firms from different countries merge, a lot of the time they fail the 
integration process due to conflicts caused by cultural differences (See, for example, 
Finkelstein (1999), Zhu and Huang (2007), Drogendijk and Slangen (2006)).  Thus, I 
assume that integrating target firm’s capabilities into the acquiring firm is costly for 
cross-border M&A and this integration cost is more costly for market-specific expertise 
than technological capability.  Technological capability is transferred directly upon 
acquisition and no IC needs to be spent to realize the synergy effect. 
The intuition behind this is based on the assumption that technological capability 
is readily transferable.  For example, transferring technological capability can be as 
                                               
34 This is sufficient condition to insure that M&A takes place in equilibrium. If expected synergy effect is 
less than one it is possible that M&A won’t take place because it can actually harm your productivity.  
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simple as just sending the blue prints to a specific technology from the target firm to the 
acquiring firm.  Cultural barrier shouldn’t have any affect on this process but for market-
specific expertise, since it represents knowledge on local marketing strategy, local market 
condition, and local tastes, overcoming the cultural barrier and understanding the target 
firm’s local culture is crucial to the acquirer if it wants to fully utilize market-specific 
expertise.  Thus, I assume in my model that acquiring firm must incur IC if it wants to 
fully integrate the target firm’s market-specific expertise, but no IC is necessary for 
integrating the technological capability.  In the next section, I present a descriptive 
statistical evidence of my argument. 
 
3.1.  Descriptive statistical evidence 
Table 10 shows the number of acquisitions made by foreign firms into United 
States35. 
 
Table 10. Number of foreign acquisitions into U.S. in Manufacturing and Non-
manufacturing sectors and the ratio 
  Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
Ratio (Manufacturing/Non-
manufacturing) 
Australia 165 371 0.44 
Canada 1069 2309 0.46 
France 345 337 1.02 
Germany 421 339 1.24 
Japan 556 358 1.55 
United Kingdom 1421 1844 0.77 
   
As we can see from the table, France, Germany and Japan made more acquisitions 
in manufacturing sector than in non-manufacturing sector whereas Australia, Canada and 
United Kingdom made more acquisitions in non-manufacturing sector.  If we look at the 
                                               
35 Acquisition data are from SDC platinum. 
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ratios of number of acquisitions in manufacturing to non-manufacturing, it becomes more 
evident that France, Germany and Japan were more active in manufacturing sector’s 
M&A market and Australia, Canada and United Kingdom were more active in non-
manufacturing sector’s M&A market.  This suggests that since R&D expenditure is much 
higher in manufacturing sector than in non-manufacturing sector, French, German and 
Japanese firms’ motives were generally to acquire technological capability whereas the 
Australian, Canadian, and British firms’ motives were generally to acquire market-
specific expertise.  Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States speak the same 
language and are known to share similar culture.  On the other hand, France, Germany, 
and Japan do not speak the same language as in United States and their cultures are not as 
similar to United States as the former group.  This stark distinction is quite surprising if 
we assume integration cost for both capabilities is homogeneous.  
If we assume cultural difference between the two merging firms imply high IC for 
market-specific expertise relative to technological capability the result of this table is not 
so surprising.  For Australia, Canada and United Kingdom, IC that the firms have to incur 
after acquiring market-specific expertise would be relatively low since cultural distance 
with United States is relatively small, thus it wouldn’t be much difficult for them to 
integrate the market-specific expertise of the target firm.  But for firms from France, 
Germany, and Japan, this IC would be pretty high causing them to prefer technological 
capability driven acquisition, which does not require high IC.  Thus, the summary 
statistics provide some evidence for heterogeneous integration cost between the two 
capabilities. 
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APPENDIX C 
LEMMA AND PROPOSITION PROOFS 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. 
This is the proof shown in Nocke and Yeaple (2004).  The endogenous variable u in 
country k may be written as a function of the country sizes, ( , )k lf Y Y , where the first 
argument refers to the own country size, and the second argument to the size of the other 
country.  Assuming differentiability of f (which can be verified to hold for our problem at 
hand), the endogenous change in the value of ku is given by 
1 2( , ) ( , )
k k l k k l ldu f Y Y dY f Y Y dY  , where if is the derivative of f with respect to its ith 
argument.  Similarly, the endogenous change in the value of 
1 2( , ) ( , )
l l k l l k kdu f Y Y dY f Y Y dY  .  Since k lY Y , we have ( , ) ( , )k l l ki if Y Y f Y Y . 
Moreover, by assumption, k ldY dY  , and so 
1 2( , ) ( , )
l k l k k l l kdu f Y Y dY f Y Y dY du     . 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. 
I use similar proof method used in Nocke and Yeaple (2004) to prove Proposition 2.  
From the market clearing condition (13), we know that ( ) 1 ( )s gH m H m  .  So the 
merger market clearing condition (1 ( )) ( )k k l lg sE H m E H m  (k stands for the large 
country and l stands for the small country; k lE E  and the thresholds in country k and l 
are the same when the two countries are identical) can be written as 
( ) ( )k k l ls sE H m E H m .  
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Taking the logarithm of the merger market clearing condition and taking the total 
derivative yields, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k k l lk l
s s s s
k k l l
s s
h m dm h m dmdE dE
E H m E H m
    
Using Lemma 1 and the fact that countries were identical before the change in Y, 
this equation can be written as 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k k k kk k
s s s s
k k k k
s s
h m dm h m dmdE dE
E H m E H m
    , which simplifies to 
     
( ) ( )
2 ( )
k k k kk
s s s s
k k
s
h m dm h m dmdE
E H m

     (18) 
Now I will look at the free entry condition from equation (12) for country k, which 
is
0
( ) ( ) 0k eV m dH m F

  .   
This can be written as: 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kk k
gs x
k k
s x
k
a
k k
g a
mm m
k k l k l
c
m m
m
k l l k l l
c e
m m
Q dH m S m S T m dH m S m S m F dH m
S mg S mg Q F dH m S mg S mg Q IC dH m F
 


     
       
  
 
 
I’m going to define ( ) ( )
i
i
m
m mdH m

   . 
And simplify the free entry condition as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
k k k k k k k k l k l k l k l k
s s g g s x x g
l k l k l k k k l k k
g a a c a x g a e
Q H m S m S m S g m S T m S T m S m S m
S g m S g m S g m F H m H m Q H m IC H m F
   
 
              
           
 
Now take total derivative of this expression and applying Lemma 1:  
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( ( ) ( ) 1)
[ ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )] 0
k k k
s g
k k k k k k k
s g s x g a
dQ H m H m
dS m g m T m T m g m g m   
  
               
 
Note that 0kidm   due to the envelope theorem and the fact that the thresholds are 
efficient from the firms’ point of view in that they maximize (expected) profits. 
Also, note that ( ( ) ( ) 1)k ks gH m H m   is positive 
and
[ ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )] 0k k k k k ks g s x g am g m T m T m g m g m                      
because ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k k ks x g am m m m       . 
Therefore, I can conclude that kdQ and kdS  has opposite signs, i.e. they move in the 
opposite direction. 
Now I will take logs and then take total derivatives of the threshold equations: 
k
k
s k l
Q
m
S S T


, 
(1 )
k c
x l
F
m
S T


, 
( )( 1)
l
k
g k l
Q
m
S S g

 
, 
(1 )
k c
a l
IC F
m
S g



. 
Taking total derivatives and appealing to Lemma 1, I get the following conditions: 
(1 )
(1 )
k k k
s
k k k
s
dm dQ T dS
m Q T S



 

 , 
k k
x
k k
x
dm dS
m S
 , 
(1 )
( )
(1 )
k k k
g
k k k
g
dm dQ dS
m Q S



  

, 
k k
a
k k
a
dm dS
m S
 . 
We can see from this that ksdm  moves in the opposite direction as 
kdS and kxdm  and 
k
adm  
move in the same direction as kdS .  Therefore, we can also conclude from equation (18) 
that kdE and kdS move in the same direction.  However, kgdm  can be ambiguous because 
if kdS  increase kdQ will decrease so it is not clear how kgdm  will move as 
kdS  increase.  
Thus it will depend on the magnitude of kdS and kdQ .  
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Let’s first assume that price Q does not adjust at all with a change in Y.  Then kdQ will 
equal zero and kgdm and 
kdS will move in the opposite direction.  Thus, as long as 
kdQ change by a small  amount, kgdm  and 
kdS will still move in the opposite direction 
and Proposition 2 will hold.  Therefore, price Q needs to be inelastic and does not change 
much with a change in Y. 
Lastly, I will look at 1( )
k
k
k
Y
S
P 

  
  which is also equal to 
2(1 ) { [ ( ) ( 1) ( )]
[ ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )]}
k
k k k k
s g
l l l l l
s x g a
Y
S E m g m
E T m T m g m g m



   
    
          
 
By taking logarithm and taking total derivative I get the following equation: 
{(1 ) ( ) ( 1)(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) }
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1)(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
k
k
k k k k k k k kdEk
s s g g x x a aE
k k k k k
s x g a
k
k
T m dm g m dm T m dm g m dmdS
S T m T m g m g m
dY
Y
   
   
               

           

 
Since ( ) 0im  , the term in curly brackets has the same sign as 
kdS and kdE .  Hence it 
must be the case that when kdY  is positive kdS  is also positive implying that they move 
in the same direction.  Therefore, if there is a small increase in the size of country k and a 
small decrease in the size of country lk such that 0k ldY dY   , then 0k ldS dS   , 
and 0k ls sdm dm   , 0
k l
x xdm dm   , 0
k l
g gdm dm   , and 0
k l
a adm dm   .  
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